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Regulatory Framework Mappings

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Accessibility

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AWWA Security Guidance

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German Remote Maintenance BSI-CS 108

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DHS Trusted Internet Connections

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IEC 62443

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NERC-CIP

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NIST CSF 1.1

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NIST 800-82

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IEC 62443

Dispel’s Alignment With IEC 62443

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Introduction

Industrial automation and control system (“IACS”) organizations increasingly use commercial off-the-shelf (“COTS”) networked devices that are inexpensive, efficient, and highly automated. Control systems are also increasingly interconnected with non-IACS networks for valid business reasons. These devices, open networking technologies, and increased connectivity elevate the theoretical cyber risk of control system hardware and software. This, in turn, has raised concerns over Health, Safety and Environmental (“HSE”), financial, and/or reputational consequences from cyberattacks on deployed control systems.

IEC 62443 is not a proscriptive guide. The goal of the IEC 62443 series is to provide a flexible framework that facilitates addressing current and future vulnerabilities in IACSs and applying necessary mitigations in a systematic, defensible manner through an IACS Security Program (an “IACS SP”). For those readers working in Corporate, the reports you receive on Security Program efficacy are based off of Security Program Ratings (“SPRs”) – quantified assessments of the SP efficacy.

IEC 62443 in Context

Much like the interrelationship between the National Institute of Standards and Technology (“NIST”) Cyber Security Framework (the “CSF”) Version 1.1 and the NIST Special Publications (the “NIST SP”s), IEC 62443 is structured as a series of interleaving modular documents. These documents are categorized into four series, with the designation structure of IEC 62443-[series]-[sub document number].

The IEC 62443-1 series exists to define the terms and frameworks off of which the rest of the documents and recommendations contained in IEC 62443 rely.

The IEC 62443-2 series is used to define the roles, responsibilities, requirements, and audit mechanisms for the organizational structure and management of the IACS SP. As such, the IEC 62443-2 series is the one that you are most likely to encounter first if coming over from Corporate or serving in an advisory capacity to a firm that follows IEC 62443. However, with the exception of IEC 62443-2-4, the rest of IEC 62443-2 is not the series of direct relevance to assessing products or services going into an IACS.

As a point of clarification, while new readers of the IEC 62443-2 series will notice that it generally references the IEC 62443-3 series when discussing product capabilities, they will also notice that some sections, such as §8.4 of IEC 62443-2-1, have documentation requirements which implicitly require any productized solution to have a set of underlying features. While true, with the exception of IEC 62443-2-4, sections throughout the rest of the series, including §8.4 of IEC 62443-2-1, are still cross-referenced over to IEC 62443-3.

IEC 62443-2-4 serves as a guide for third parties interacting with an IACS on what to request at an organizational and procedural level from the IACS owner. IEC 62443-2-4 is the exception to the rest of the IEC 62443-2 series in that, regrettably, it does not provide a cross referencing structure as of the time of this document’s printing.

The IEC 62443-3 series is most usefully perceived as the mapping series within the broader IEC 62443 structure from objectives to practical implementation at a technological level. Here, Framework Requirements (“FR”s) are aligned with System Requirements (“SR”) for control systems.

The IEC 62443-4 series serves as a guide for suppliers of systems that form, or form a part of, a control system. As with IEC 62443-3, Framework Requirements (“FR”s) are aligned with System Requirements (“SR”) for control systems. IEC 62443-4-1 is primarily focused on applying a standardized process to the development, deployment, and sustainment of product. IEC 62443-4-2 is primarily focused on defining the security attributes and capabilities that should be present within a control system, or a supporting component thereto.

Based upon the above summary, the remainder of this document is focused on Dispel’s coverage with respect to IEC 62443-3 and IEC 624430-4.

Recover

Planning (RC.RP)

NIST Definition: Recovery processes and procedures are executed and maintained to ensure restoration of systems or assets affected by cybersecurity incidents.

Section

How Dispel Helps

RC.RP-1

Recovery plan is executed during or after a cybersecurity incident.

Dispel's network can rapidly stand back up in matter of seconds or minutes, significantly increasing resiliency of organization and limiting business impacts.

Communications (RC.CO)

NIST Definition: Restoration activities are coordinated with internal and external parties (e.g. coordinating centers, Internet Service Providers, owners of attacking systems, victims, other CSIRTs, and vendors).

Section

How Dispel Helps

RC.CO-3

Recovery activities are communicated to internal and external stakeholders as well as executive and management teams.

Dispel network can provide off channel, secure, and backup communications to allow simple rapid communications and coordination across organization, teams as well as third party support personnel.

Accessibility Statement

Adherence to Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG 2.1) and ISO/IEC 40500:2012

Dispel is committed to making its websites and applications accessible, in accordance with Title III of the U.S. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101) and, for our U.S. Government clients, Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 USC § 794d).

To meet this commitment, our websites and applications have been designed to conform to the W3C Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG) 2.1, Level AA. Our applications use both native operating system (“OS”) elements and brand designs. By using native elements, Dispel leverages the powerful accessibility features provided by the OS manufacturer. If not otherwise covered by the native OS, our brand designs are intended to conform to the WCAG 2.1, Level AA.

The information in this document is not legal advice. If you have questions about the applicability of the policies to specific situations, please consult legal authorities for the appropriate jurisdiction.

Download a copy of our Accessibility Statement here:

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Dispel Accessibility Statement 2021

Technical Information About Dispel’s Website and Application Accessibility

Dispel is committed to making its websites and applications accessible, in accordance with the U.S. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. § 12101).

Compliance Status

Information on our compliance status is detailed in our Accessibility Conformance Report (ACR) based on the ITI Voluntary Product Accessibility Template® (VPAT®). Dispel uses the VPAT 2.4 INT, which incorporates revised Section 508 standards (the U.S. Federal accessibility standard), EN 301 549 (the European Union’s “Accessibility requirements suitable for public procurement of ICT products and services in Europe”), and WCAG 2.1 and ISO/IEC 40500 (W3C/WAI’s recently updated Web Content Accessibility Guidelines).

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Feedback and Contact Information

We’re always looking to improve the accessibility of our websites and applications. If you have feedback or concerns related to the accessibility of any content on our websites or applications, have ideas or comments that would help us improve the accessibility and usability of our website, or think we’re not meeting accessibility requirements, please email us at . If applicable, please include the web address or URL and the specific problems you have encountered.

The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) is responsible for enforcing the American with Disabilities Act (ADA).

Despite our very best efforts to allow anybody to adjust our websites and applications to their needs, there may still be aspects that are not fully accessible, are in the process of becoming accessible, or are lacking an adequate technological solution to make them accessible. Still, we are continually improving our accessibility; adding, updating, and improving its options, and features; and developing and adopting new technologies. All this is meant to reach the optimal level of accessibility, following technological advancements.

If you’re not happy with how we respond to your complaint, you may contact the DoJ Civil Rights Division to file a complaint.

To file an ADA complaint online:

To file an ADA complaint by mail, send the completed to:

U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division 950 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 4CON, 9th Floor Washington, DC 20530

To file an ADA complaint by facsimile, fax the completed to:

(202) 307-1197

For more information on how to file an ADA complaint with the DoJ, please visit .

Industrial control systems touch everyone’s lives, depending upon contributions from individuals all around the world. Dispel designs and builds our tools with accessibility as a central tenant of our ethos.

Our customers are required by law to comply with regulations governing accessibility, such as the U.S. American with Disabilities Act (ADA), European Accessibility Act (EAA), UK Equality Act 2010, Accessible Canada Act (ACA), and Australian Disability Discrimination Act (DDA).

All told, there are currently 40 web accessibility laws and policies in place across 23 countries and political unions. A preponderance of these regulations do not give strict technical guidance on how to make a site or service accessible; leaving the task up to the discretion and liability of the service provider. Many regulations, however, use the Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (“WCAG”) as a standard or baseline. This is further recognized as an international standard: ISO/IEC 40500:2012.

The WCAG is authored by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), who develop international standards. Of relevance here, their accessibility standards are, in turn, reviewed by the Accessible Platform Architectures (“APA”) Working Group. As of writing WCAG is in version 2.1, with a 2.2 working draft in review. There is also an incomplete 3.0 working draft. For our purposes when talking about the WCAG going forward in this document, we will be speaking about version 2.1. You can find the current reference to the WCAG 2.1 here:

While the WCAG provides a technical list of requirements to fulfill, it’s good to start with the four tenants around which W3C builds out their specifications.

This section provides a summary of the WCAG principals. For the normative technical specification, see .

These four basic principles are websites must be:

  1. Perceivable - Information and user interface components must be presentable to users in ways they can perceive. This means that users must be able to perceive the information being presented (it can't be invisible to all of their senses).

  2. Operable - User interface components and navigation must be operable. This means that users must be able to operate the interface (the interface cannot require interaction that a user cannot perform).

  3. Understandable - Information and the operation of user interface must be understandable. This means that users must be able to understand the information as well as the operation of the user interface (the content or operation cannot be beyond their understanding).

There are five requirements that must be met for content to be classified as ‘conforming’ to WCAG 2.1.

Requirements

WCAG 2.1 items contain success criteria, which are written as testable criteria to objectively determine of a certain implementation satisfies the item.

For example, 1.4.1 Use of Color requires that “color is not used as the only visual means of conveying information, indicating an action, prompting a response, or distinguishing a visual element.” In other words, you can’t just have text change from red to green to signify something to a user. There are sufficient techniques that can be used in conjunction with color to convey meaning to those individuals with partial sight, limited color vision, or monochromatic displays. 1.4.1 provides success criteria techniques to meet compliance. Some are: (G14) Ensuring that information conveyed by color differences is also available in text; (G205) Including a text cue for colored form control labels; (G182) Ensuring that additional visual cues are available when text color differences are used to convey information; and (G183) Using a contrast ratio of 3:1 with surrounding text and providing additional visual cues on hover for links or controls where color alone is used to identify them.[1]

Conformance with WCAG means that an implementation of an item satisfies the requirements the Success Criteria. Most items have one level of conformance—in other words, you either meet the Success Criteria, or you do not. There are some circumstances when items have three levels of conformance: Level A, AA, and AAA.

One’s natural instinct is to aspire for Level AAA conformance across the board. Unfortunately the WCAG is written so that complete conformance is not possible. Indeed, the authors at W3C themselves note: “It is not recommended that Level AAA conformance be required as a general policy for entire sites because it is not possible to satisfy all Level AAA Success Criteria for some content.”[2] Our goal then is to maximize accessibility as much as reasonably possible without creating an undue burden.

Dispel provides its customers with applications on Apple macOS®, iPadOS®, iOS; and on Microsoft Windows®.

These operation systems come with accessibility features of their own. For example, macOS includes a wide variety of features and assistive technologies that include screen and cursor magnification, a full-featured screen reader, visual flash alerts, closed captioning support, and more.[3]

Dispel’s applications use native design elements—referred to as “modern design” for UWP Windows apps and “design style” for Apple macOS—when building our products. These UI elements often come with built-in accessibility, providing an accessible user experience by default.

To learn more about Apple’s accessibility features, please visit:

To learn more about Microsoft’s accessibility features, please visit:

In the context of our Compliance Status, OS-derived accessibility features are the responsibility of Apple and Microsoft.

This statement was prepared on April 8, 2021.

For UK Article 3(1) of Commission Implementing Decision (EU) 2018/1523, this accessibility statement was prepared using Version 2.4 of the ITI Voluntary Product Accessibility Template® (VPAT®) INI edition.

This statement was last reviewed on April 8, 2021.

[1] W3C, “Understanding Success Criterion 1.4.1: Use of Color.” WCAG 2.1. Available: , Accessed April 1, 2021.

[2] W3C Working Group, “Understanding Conformance.” Understanding WCAG 2.0. October 7, 2016. Accessible: , Accessed April 1, 2021.

[3] Apple Inc., “macOS.” Accessibility for Developers. Accessible: , Accessed April 8, 2021.

CIP-011-2

Cyber Security - Information Protection

Purpose

To prevent unauthorized access to BES Cyber System Information by specifying information protection requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES).

Sections and Standards

There are two requirements in CIP-011, with applicable requirement parts presented in tables. Below, the contents of each requirement are reproduced below under "Part" and "Requirement." "Product/Feature" indicates which Dispel product helps an organization comply to this requirement, and "Technical Supplement" details how this compliance is achieved.

Requirement 1

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented information protection program(s) that collectively includes each of the applicable requirement parts in the CIP-011-2 Table R1 - Information Protection

Table R1 - Information Protection

Part

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts in CIP-011-2 Table R2-BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

1.1

“Method(s) to identify information that meets the definition of BES Cyber System Information.”

Dispel documentation

Due to the compartmentalized nature of accounts at Dispel, this is met by simply documenting what a given network is protecting. Dispel is happy to provide customers with training to identify BES Cyber System Information when deploying Dispel networks.

1.2

“Procedure(s) for protecting and securely handling BES Cyber System Information, including storage, transit, and use.”

End-to-end encryption, Dispel documentation

Dispel’s products should be thought of as an enabler of 1.2. Standard-issue Dispel networks are single-tenant Moving Target Defense SD-WANs whose tunnels are encrypted with AES-256 using independent 4096-bit keys for the initial key exchange.

Part

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

2.1-2

(2.1) “Prior to the release for reuse of applicable Cyber Assets that contain BES Cyber System Information (except for reuse within other systems identified in the “Applicable Systems” column), the Responsible Entity shall take action to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the Cyber Asset data storage media.”

(2.2) “Prior to the disposal of applicable Cyber Assets that contain BES Cyber System Information, the Responsible Entity shall take action to prevent the unauthorized retrieval of BES Cyber System Information from the Cyber Asset or destroy the data storage media.”

Disposable components, automated network refreshes, virtual desktops

Dispel’s network infrastructure is made up of virtual machines. When destroying a virtual machine, the drives are zeroed before being released.

Requirement 2

Table R2 - BES Cyber Asset Reuse and Disposal

Robust - Content must be robust enough that it can be interpreted reliably by a wide variety of user agents, including assistive technologies. This means that users must be able to access the content as technologies advance (as technologies and user agents evolve, the content should remain accessible).

Requirement

Details

Requirement 1: Conformance Level

One of the following levels of conformance is met in full.

Level A: For Level A conformance (the minimum level of conformance), the Web page satisfies all the Level A Success Criteria, or a conforming alternate version is provided.

Level AA: For Level AA conformance, the Web page satisfies all the Level A and Level AA Success Criteria, or a Level AA conforming alternate version is provided.

Level AAA: For Level AAA conformance, the Web page satisfies all the Level A, Level AA and Level AAA Success Criteria, or a Level AAA conforming alternate version is provided.

Requirement 2: Full Pages

Conformance (and conformance level) is for full Web page(s) only, and cannot be achieved if part of a Web page is excluded.

Requirement 3: Complete Processes

When a Web page is one of a series of Web pages presenting a process (i.e., a sequence of steps that need to be completed in order to accomplish an activity), all Web pages in the process conform at the specified level or better. (Conformance is not possible at a particular level if any page in the process does not conform at that level or better.)

Requirement 4: Only Accessibility-Supported Ways of Using Technologies

Only accessibility-supported ways of using technologies are relied upon to satisfy the success criteria. Any information or functionality that is provided in a way that is not accessibility supported is also available in a way that is accessibility supported.

Enforcement Procedure

About WCAG and What We’re Doing to Improve Accessibility

WCAG 2.1 as Our Standard

Four Tenants of WCAG

Understanding Conformance

Success Criteria

Application Accessibility Across Device Platforms

Preparation of this Accessibility Statement

accessibility@dispel.com
Civil Right Division Online Complaint Form
ADA complaint form
ADA complaint form
their website
https://www.w3.org/WAI/WCAG21/quickref/
www.w3.org/TR/WCAG21
https://www.apple.com/accessibility/
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/accessibility/windows
https://www.w3.org/WAI/WCAG21/Understanding/use-of-color.html
https://www.w3.org/TR/UNDERSTANDING-WCAG20/conformance.html
https://developer.apple.com/accessibility/

Requirement 5: Non-Interference

If technologies are used in a way that is not accessibility supported, or if they are used in a non-conforming way, then they do not block the ability of users to access the rest of the page. In addition, the Web page as a whole continues to meet the conformance requirements under each of the following conditions:

1. when any technology that is not relied upon is turned on in a user agent,

2. when any technology that is not relied upon is turned off in a user agent, and

3. when any technology that is not relied upon is not supported by a user agent

In addition, the following success criteria apply to all content on the page, including content that is not otherwise relied upon to meet conformance, because failure to meet them could interfere with any use of the page:

  • 1.4.2 - Audio Control,

  • 2.1.2 - No Keyboard Trap,

  • 2.3.1 - Three Flashes or Below Threshold, and

  • 2.2.2 - Pause, Stop, Hide.

BSI Rules on Remote Maintenance in Industrial Environments

BSI-CS 108, Version 1.00

To get Dispel's complete mapping, download our document here:

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Introduction

The German Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik, or “BSI”) sets security standards and recommendations for federal agencies; corporations, institutions and foundations under public law; as well as public companies that are majority owned by the federal government and that provide IT services for the federal administration. Private companies often also use BSI recommendations for their own cybersecurity planning.

BSI, Industrial Control System Security, & Remote Access

The BSI has several documents focusing on remote access, divided into two primary categories: IT and OT.

The IT-focused BSI-CS 054 Grundregeln zur Absicherung von Fernwartungszugängen addresses allowing remote access within environments ranging across home networks, small businesses, enterprise, and government authorities.[1]

Because OT environments are unique in their device types, maintenance windows, network configurations, and the risk impact of an attack against critical infrastructure the BSI also issues two recommendations for OT access. The more broad ICS Security Compendium[2] draws heavily upon IEC 62443, VDI/VDE 2182, NERC CIP, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security Best Practices. Focusing specifically on remote access, the BSI has also issued particular recommendations in BSI-CS 108 Remote Maintenance in Industrial Environments.[3] Because of its singular focus on remote access, we address our alignment with BSI-CS 108 in this document. This complements Dispel’s other alignments with IEC 62443, NERC CIP, , and other cybersecurity frameworks.

The BSI recommendations are broken into the following five categories:[4]

1. Architecture

2. Secure communications

3. Authentication mechanisms

4. Organizational requirements

5. Miscellaneous

In this document we provide a 1:1 mapping of the technical requirements within each category against Dispel capabilities.


[1] BSI, Grundregeln zur Absicherung von Fernwartungszugängen. November 11, 2018. Version 2.0.

[2] BSI, ICS Security Compendium. 2023. Version 1.23.

[3] BSI, Remote maintenance in industrial environments. 2015. Version 1.00.

[4] Ibid., 1-3.

Additional Sections

A quick summary of NERC CIP standards not previously discussed.

CIP-002-5.1 provides criteria for applicable Responsible Entities to categorize their BES Cyber Systems based on the impact of their associated facilities, systems, and equipment, which, if impaired, would affect the Bulk Electric System's ability to operate. The scope of these standards is limited to BES Cyber Systems, which, "if rendered unavailable, degraded, or misused, would adversely impact the reliable operation of the BES within 15 minutes of the activation or exercise of the compromise." Notably, in Version 4, BES Cyber Systems were previously referred to as Critical Cyber Assets.

CIP-003-7 aims to protect BES Cyber Systems by specifying consistent and sustainable security management controls that establish responsibility and accountability. Responsibile Entities are required to review and maintain CIP Senior Manager approval at least once every 15 calendar months for one or more documented cyber security policies obtained from a list of topics. Depending on the specific type of facilities, equipment or system, or subset of such, these requirements vary.

CIP-004-6 serves to minimize risk against compromise in BES Cyber Systems. Misoperation or instability from individuals accessing BES Cyber Systems can be mitigated through requiring an appropriate amount of personnel risk assessment, training, and security awareness. Requirements for training content include topics such as cyber security policies, physical and electronic access controls, the visitor control program, handling and storage of BES Cyber System information, etc.

CIP-008-5 specifies incident response requirements in order to mitigate the risk of a Cyber Security Incident on the reliable operation of the BES Cyber System. The Cyber Security Response Plan requirements discussed are listed with corresponding applicable systems and necessary measures to be taken. Response Plan requirements include identifying, classifying, and responding to Cyber Security Incidents and establishing the roles of response groups and individuals.

BSI-CS 108 Categories

DHS TIC
https://www.allianz-fuer-cybersicherheit.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/Webs/ACS/DE/BSI-CS/BSI-CS_054.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1
https://www.bsi.bund.de/SharedDocs/Downloads/EN/BSI/ICS/ICS-Security_compendium.html
https://www.bsi.bund.de/EN/Themen/Unternehmen-und-Organisationen/Informationen-und-Empfehlungen/Empfehlungen-nach-Angriffszielen/Industrielle-Steuerungs-und-Automatisierungssysteme/Allgemeine-Empfehlungen/Empfehlungen-fuer-ICS-Betreiber/empfehlungen-fuer-ics-betreiber.html

CIP-008-6 requires Responsible Entities to develop and implement Cyber Security Incident response plans to detect and protect against incidents that affect BES Cyber Systems. This standard specifies processes and procedures to be included in response plans, as well as actions related to implementation, testing, maintence, and reporting related to such response plans. CIP-008-6 differs from CIP 008-5 by broadening the mandatory reporting of Cyber Security Incidents to include compromises or attempts to compromise BES Cyber Systems or their associated ESPs or EACMS.

CIP-009-6 aims to specify recovery plan requirements to recover reliability functions performed by BES Cyber Systems. The Recovery Plan Specifications list the applicable systems, along with measures to be taken. Examples of Recovery Plan Requirements include: conditions for activation of recovery plans, roles and responsibilities of responders, and processes for the backup and storage of information required to recover BES Cyber System functionality.

CIP-010-2 specifies configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements in order to prevent and detect unauthorized changes to BES Cyber Systems. The Configuration Change Management Requirements list corresponding applicable systems, as well as necessary measures to be taken. Examples of Configuration Change Management Requirements provided in this standard include: developing a baseline configuration, authorizing/documenting changes that deviate from the baseline configuration, and updating the baseline configuring as necessary within 30 days of completing a change that deviates from the existing baseline configuration.

CIP-010-3 is similar to CIP-010-2 in that it aims to prevent and detect unauthorized changes to BES Cyber Systems by specifying configuration change management and vulnerability assessment requirements. The modification unique to CIP-010-3 lies in Requirement Part 1.6, which covers all changes that deviate from an existing baseline configuration associated with baseline items in operating systems, commercially available or open-source application software, and security patches applied. In order for baseline changes to occur, entities must verify the identity of the software source, and verify the integrity of the software obtained from the software source.

CIP-002-5.1 Cyber Security — BES Cyber System Categorization

CIP-003-7 Cyber Security — Security Management Controls

CIP-004-6 Cyber Security – Personnel & Training

CIP-008-5 Cyber Security — Incident Reporting and Response Planning

CIP-008-6 Cyber Security — Incident Reporting and Response Planning (Future Enforcement)

CIP-009-6 Cyber Security — Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems

CIP-010-2 Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

CIP-010-3 Cyber Security — Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments (Future Enforcement)

NIST Cybersecurity Framework 1.1

Mapping Dispel to NIST

Dispel’s impact across the NIST framework across all 5 standards.

Using Dispel’s platform can impact an organization’s cybersecurity profile across all five functions of the NIST cyber security framework: identify, protect, detect, respond, and recover.

Although each deployment may be slightly different, this document contains a sample mapping of potential categories and subcategories where the Dispel platform and infrastructure could support an organization’s CSF activities.

Introduction

This guide shows how Dispel's technology supports regulatory and framework requirements and guidelines.

Welcome

This handbook will walk you through cybersecurity regulatory frameworks specific to various industries, and explain how Dispel aligns to their stated requirements.

Regulatory frameworks are released by industry-leading bodies to guide cybersecurity practices in their respective fields.

Dispel's technology helps companies uphold many of the cybersecurity requirements and recommendations that these organizations release.

The regulatory frameworks discussed in this guide include:

  • AWWA Security Guidance

If you don't see your framework listed, please contact Dispel at .

DHS Trusted Internet Connections
IEC 62443
NERC CIP
NIST CSF 1.1
NIST-800-82
hello@dispel.io

Respond

Communications (RS.CO)

NIST Definition: Response activities are coordinated with internal and external stakeholders (e.g. external support from law enforcement agencies).

Section

How Dispel Helps

RS.CO-4

Coordination with stakeholders occurs consistent with response plans.

Dispel facilitates simple and easy communication and can provide off channel network for coordination among internal and external teams.

Analysis (RS.AN)

NIST Definition: Analysis is conducted to ensure effective response and support recovery activities.

NIST Definition: Activities are performed to prevent expansion of an event, mitigate its effects, and resolve the incident.

Detect

Anomalies and Events (DE.AE)

NIST Definition: Anomalous activity is detected and the potential impact of events is understood.

Section

How Dispel Helps

DE.AE-1

A baseline of network operations and expected data flows for users and systems is established and managed.

Dispel networks can create clean start network, and vastly simplify network traffic and noise, allowing for simple analysis and management.

Security Continuous Monitoring (DE.CM)

NIST Definition: The information system and assets are monitored to identify cybersecurity events and verify the effectiveness of protective measures.

Identify

NIST Definition: The data, personnel, devices, systems, and facilities that enable the organization to achieve business purposes are identified and managed consistent with their relative importance to organizational objectives and the organization’s risk strategy.

Overview

The Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative, since its establishment in 2007, has moved the government from a period of uncontrolled and unmonitored internet connections to a controlled state, reducing the .gov’s attack surface. In accordance with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) : Update to the TIC Initiative, TIC 3.0 expands on the original initiative to drive security standards and leverage advances in technology to secure a wide spectrum of agency network architectures. This new version of TIC is highly iterative, which means the guidance will better reflect modern processes and technological innovations compared to previous iterations of the program. TIC 3.0 recognizes shifts in modern cybersecurity and pushes agencies toward adoption, while recognizing their challenges and constraints in modernizing IT infrastructure.

The purpose of the Trusted Internet Connections (TIC) initiative, as outlined in the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) : Update to the TIC Initiative, was to enhance network and perimeter security across the Federal Government.

Initially, this was done through the consolidation of external connections and the deployment of common tools at these access points. While this prior work has been invaluable in securing federal networks and information, the program must adapt to modern architectures and frameworks for government information technology (IT) resource utilization. Accordingly, OMB’s memorandum provides an enhanced approach for implementing the TIC initiative that provides agencies with increased flexibility to use modern security capabilities. OMB’s memorandum also establishes a process for ensuring the TIC initiative is agile and responsive to advancements in technology and rapidly evolving threats.

Section

How Dispel Helps

DE.CM-1

The network is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.

Dispel networks all integrate with Syslog to allow simple reporting of actions and activity, as well as allowing recording of individual session activity on virtual desktops.

DE.CM-3

Personnel activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.

Dispel systems can automatically record activity on VDI machines used by personnel.

DE.CM-6

External service provider activity is monitored to detect potential cybersecurity events.

Dispel systems provide a holistic platform to control, monitor, and limit service provider activity.

DE.CM-7

Monitoring for unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software is performed.

Dispel’s monitoring system aids in detecting unauthorized personnel, connections, devices, and software.

Section

How Dispel Helps

RS.AN-3

Forensics are performed.

For third-parties performing forensics, Dispel aids in providing secure access.

RS.AN-5

Processes are established to receive, analyze and respond to vulnerabilities disclosed to the organization from internal and external sources (e.g. internal testing, security bulletins, or security researchers).

Dispel aids in providing secure system access for testing, whether for internal or external testers.

Section

How Dispel Helps

RS.MI-1

Incidents are contained.

Dispel’s ability to segment and limit access can significantly reduce blast radius of an incident, and ability to quickly remove access and/or cycle the system can reduce impact of an incident.

RS.MI-2

Incidents are mitigated.

Dispel's network can be refreshed or deployed in matter of seconds or minutes, significantly increasing resiliency of organization and limiting business impacts. Components of new network are built from golden images in new location and data center, in a clean environment.

Mitigation (RS.MI)

NIST Definition: The organization’s mission, objectives, stakeholders, and activities are understood and prioritized; this information is used to inform cybersecurity roles, responsibilities, and risk management decisions.

NIST Definition: The organization understands the cybersecurity risk to organizational operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), organizational assets, and individuals.

NIST Definition: The organization’s priorities, constraints, risk tolerances, and assumptions are established and used to support risk decisions associated with managing supply chain risk. The organization has established and implemented the processes to identify, assess and manage supply chain risks.

Section

How Dispel Helps

ID.AM-3

Organizational communication and data flows are mapped.

Dispel networks create simple, clear data flows between different systems, individuals, and units.

ID.AM-4

External information systems are catalogued.

Dispel creates a clear list of external systems and individuals granted access to infrastructure/systems.

Asset Management (ID.AM)

On April 7, 2021, CISA released finalized versions of the
and
. The documents are the first official TIC use cases approved by the Federal Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Council for TIC 3.0.

Beginning in 2011, the Federal Government made strides toward migration into the cloud with the Cloud First Initiative, now known as Cloud Smart, moving its systems and data away from federally owned and operated networks. During this migration, impediments surfaced throughout implementation, including security challenges. To better serve its citizens, the Federal Government made a concerted push to leverage technological advancements in a secure manner. As a reaction to Executive Order (EO) 13800, Strengthening the 5 Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure, OMB, DHS, and GSA developed a report outlining the information technology (IT) modernization needs for the Federal Government. The 2017 Report to the President on Federal IT Modernization (IT Modernization Report) 6 addresses agencies’ challenges with resource prioritization, ability to procure services quickly, and technical issues by focusing on:

  • Network Modernization and Consolidation

  • Shared Services to Enable Future Network Architectures

IT Modernization Report calls for the modernization of TIC to improve protections, remove barriers, and enable cloud migration, marking the start of the 2019 TIC policy update. The report tasks the TIC initiative to:

  • Establish TIC pilots to understand new environments,

  • Update TIC Policy and associated material,

  • Accommodate the security needs of dispersed architectures, and

  • Eliminate manual TIC Compliance Validation (TCV) Process.

To address these modernization tasks, OMB, CISA, and GSA facilitated four interagency working groups and oversaw pilots to collect data used to inform the TIC policy update and reference architectures. TIC 3.0 is a response to the need for improved flexibility, security, and visibility. The program is intended to be forward-leaning and environment-agnostic. TIC 3.0 broadens the concepts of the program to accommodate cloud, mobile, and encrypted applications, services and environments. The program envisions a flexible perimeter that may protect diverse hosting environments, platforms and services in contrast to the hard enterprise perimeter as previously implemented. While the NCPS and TIC initiatives continue to support and complement each other, the initiatives are evolving independently.

What is the TIC?

You can find the source TIC documents here:

Where are we today in the process? (A: TIC 3.0)

2021: TIC 3.0 – Modernize

Memorandum (M) 19-26
Memorandum M-19-26

ID.AM-6

Cybersecurity roles and responsibilities for the entire workforce and third-party stakeholders (e.g., suppliers, customers, partners) are established.

By creating single-use paths to access networks and assets, Dispel assists in enforcing cybersecurity standards on all parties with access (both workforce and third-parties).

Section

How Dispel Helps

ID.BE-4

Dependencies and critical functions for delivery of critical services are established.

Dispel supports the core mission of the business by providing secure access to critical systems for key personnel across locations.

ID.BE-5

Resilience requirements to support delivery of critical services are established for all operating states.

Ability for systems to refresh and deploy across multiple cloud environments provides significant resiliency.

Section

How Dispel Helps

ID.RA-2

Cyber threat intelligence is received from information sharing forums and sources.

Dispel’s disposable virtual desktop platform helps threat intelligence teams discretely access forums and sources to gather intelligence without revealing their intentions, affiliations, or original location.

Section

How Dispel Helps

ID.SC-4

Suppliers and third-party partners are routinely assessed using audits, test results, or other forms of evaluations to confirm they are meeting their contractual obligations.

Dispel infrastructure provides simple means to control third party access, enforce multifactor authentication, and enforce use of organization controlled systems. When using a Dispel-built virtual desktop, the entire connection process is auditable, monitored, and recorded.

Dispel provides a means of enforcing cybersecurity standards on third parties without the need for relying on them to have those capabilities beforehand.

Business Environment (ID.BE)

Risk Assessment (ID.RA)

Supply Chain Risk Management (ID.SC)

TIC 3.0 Traditional TIC Use Case
T
IC 3.0 Branch Office Use Case
https://www.cisa.gov/publication/tic-documents-public-comment

Vol. 2: Reference Architecture

The TIC reference architecture provides guidance to system administrators when defining the scope and process for how to implement TIC. It's basically a framework for how to bucket different aspects of the program. These buckets are then managed, security-wise, in Vol 3: Security Capabilities.

You can get the original Volume 2 .

If you're looking for the exact security sections Dispel covers, go over to our .

What does the framework care about?

There are seven goals of the TIC program, and these provide the base structure for the reference architecture. The goals are:

Boundary-focused

TIC 3.0 divides agency architectures by trust zones, shifting the emphasis from a strictly physical network perimeter to the boundaries of each zone within an agency environment to ensure baseline security protections across dispersed network environments.

Descriptive, not prescriptive

The updated reference architecture, taxonomy, capabilities, and use cases will broaden the concepts of the program to accommodate cloud, mobile, and encrypted applications, services and environments.

Risk-based to accommodate varying risk tolerances

Federal agencies have varying degrees of risk tolerances that must be considered as IT modernization tasks are planned and executed. In some cases, the controls identified in the TIC 3.0 documentation may not provide enough security to adequately address residual risks necessary to protect information and systems.

Environment-agnostic

The terms, definitions, and logical components of network infrastructure and solutions are vendor and technology-neutral. Additionally, the modernized TIC provides flexibility on the application of the security capabilities to accommodate a variety of agency environments.

Dynamic and readily adaptable

To keep pace with technological innovation, the TIC Program Management Office (PMO) will continue to produce and update use cases and overlays through collaboration with agencies and service providers to maintain currency.

The program’s goal is to define scalable, comprehensive and continuous validation processes for ensuring agency implementation of TIC capabilities in contrast to the point-in-time reviews.

CISA continues to provide these security capabilities in accordance with the Federal Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2015 to protect “all information traveling between an agency information system and any information system other than an agency information system.” The NCPS EINSTEIN and TIC initiatives will continue to support and complement each other in support of this legislation. The NCPS PMO and TIC PMO will independently provide guidance for their respective initiatives.

  • Trust Zones

  • Policy Enforcement Points (PEPs)

  • Management Entities (MGMT), and

  • Security Capabilities.

CIP-007-6

Cyber Security - System Security Management

To manage system security by specifying select technical, operational, and procedural requirements in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the Bulk Electric System (BES).

There are five requirements in CIP-007, with applicable requirement parts presented in tables. Below, the contents of each requirement are reproduced below under "Part" and "Requirement." "Product/Feature" indicates which Dispel product helps an organization comply to this requirement, and "Technical Supplement" details how this compliance is achieved.

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-007-6 Table R1 - Ports and Services.

Section 5: ICS Security Architecture

Page 49 - 73 of https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-82r2.pdf

The aptly named NIST 800-82 "Guide to Industrial Control System (ICS) Security" provides guidance on how to assess and manage the cyber risks associated with industrial control systems. Section 5 of the document, titled "ICS Security Architecture", provides recommendations on network layouts and communications protocols.

Seasoned readers of NIST Standards will note that 800-82 is both remarkably flexible in its recommendations—accommodating a broad range of approaches while noting their drawbacks. In mapping Dispel's product line to this standard, then, we have focused on how Dispel enables the best practices highlighted in the document's recommendations.

Dispel Wicket External Systems Integrators ("Wicket ESIs") drive data out from a whitelisted subnet of ICS devices through a VPN connection to a single-tenant, Moving Target Defense software-defined wide area network ("MTD SD-WAN") by and through which an authenticated user can access those devices. Portions or all of a Dispel MTD SD-WAN can be set to self-destruct after a connection is completed. The result of the foregoing is that segmentation is achieved cryptographically, topologically, and temporally.

Dispel's Wicket ESIs sit on the OT-IT DMZ, providing an authenticated user with whitelisted access to a subnet of ICS devices. Dispel's Virtual Desktop components act as intermediary boundaries between users and the ICS systems to which they are connected. When set with the appropriate restrictions, Dispel Virtual Desktops can be used to conceal the network addresses of the ICS devices from the end user. At a higher level, Dispel MTD SD-WANs serve to conceal the ICS system from network reconnaissance.

Ensure Effective Response

Promote timely reaction and adapt future response to discovered threats; policies defined and implemented; simplified adoption of new countermeasures

Objective

Description

Manage Traffic

Observe, validate, and filter data connections to align with authorized activities; least privilege and default deny

Protect Traffic Confidentiality

Ensure only authorized parties can discern the contents of data in transit; sender and receiver identification and enforcement

Protect Traffic Integrity

Prevent alteration of data in transit; detect altered data in transit

Ensure System Resiliency

Promote resilient application and security services for continuous operation as the technology and threat landscape evolve

Automated and streamlined verification

Delineate the NCPS and TIC initiatives

"NCPS" is the National Cybersecurity Program System--an set of systems protecting U.S. Federal Government IT infrastructure. The web is called EINSTEIN. You can learn more about the program here.

Security Objectives of TIC 3.0

Key Concepts of TIC 3.0

here
Security Capabilities guide

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

1.1

“Where technically feasible, enable only logical network accessible ports that have been determined to be needed by the Responsible Entity, including port ranges or services where needed to handle dynamic ports. If a device has no provision for disabling or restricting logical ports on the device then those ports that are open are deemed needed.

Wicket ESI whitelisting

Dispel Wicket ESIs allow administrators to whitelist not only IP addresses and ranges, but also specific ports and ranges thereof.

Please see Visual 6A for reference

1.2

“Protect against the use of unnecessary physical input/output ports used for network connectivity, console commands, or Removable Media.”

Wicket ESI

For customers who want to meet both the spirit and letter of CIP-007-6, Dispel recommends placing a Wicket ESI physically next to the PCI/HMI equipment, and placing all of said equipment into a locked, alarmed cage.

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-007-6 Table R2 - Security Patch Management.

Part

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

2.1-4

(2.1) “A patch management process for tracking, evaluating, and installing cyber security patches for applicable Cyber Assets.”

(2.2) “At least once every 35 calendar days, evaluate security patches for applicability that have been released since the last evaluation from the source or sources identified in Part 2.1”

(2.3) “For applicable patches identified in part 2.2, within 35 calendar days of the evaluation completion, take one of the following actions: Apply the applicable patches; or create a dated mitigation plan; or revise an existing mitigation plan. Mitigation plans shall include the Responsible Entity’s planned actions to mitigate vulnerabilities addressed by each security patch and a timeframe to complete these mitigations.

(2.4) “For each mitigation plan created or revised in Part 2.3, implement the plan within the timeframe specified in the plan, unless a revision to the plan or an extension to the timeframe specified in Part 2.3 is approved by the CIP Senior Manager or delegate.

Cycling virtual components, automated network refreshes, automatic patching and updating

Dispel launches its virtual components with the latest patches each time the network is refreshed (often, at a minimum, daily). For customers that desire support in patching and tracking of underlying assets, Dispel is happy to provide upkeep as a managed service.

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-007-6 Table R3 - Malicious Code Prevention.

Part

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

3.1

“Deploy method(s) to deter, detect, or prevent malicious code.

Moving Target Defense networks, traffic logs

For deterrence and prevention, all Dispel networks are Moving Target Defense SD-WANs. For detection, all of our components speak syslog which can be tied back to a firewall or SEIM.

Please see Visual 6B for reference

3.2

“Mitigate the threat of detected malicious code.”

Disposable components, golden images

As a preventative measure, all Dispel components can be scheduled to self-destruct and rebuild periodically from golden images. If malicious code is detected between periodic refreshes, components can be manually destroyed and replaced from the Admin Console.

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-007-6 Table R4 - Security Event Monitoring.

Part

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

4.1

“Log events at the BES (Bulk Electric System) Cyber System level (per BES Cyber System capability) or at the Cyber Asset level (per Cyber Asset capability) for identification of, and after-the-fact investigations of, Cyber Security Incidents that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events: 4.1.1. Detected successful login attempts; 4.1.2. Detected failed access attempts and failed login attempts; 4.1.3 Detected malicious code.

Log server, traffic logs, audit database

Dispel places a log server within each of their networks. The Customer is able to pull these logs to their SEIM. We also have an audit database of login attempts, including successful and unsuccessful logins at the engine level.

4.2

“Generate alerts for security events that the Responsible Entity determines necessitates an alert, that includes, as a minimum, each of the following types of events (per Cyber Asset or BES Cyber System capability): 4.2.1. Detected malicious code from Part 4.1; and 4.2.2. Detected failure of Part 4.1 event logging.

Dispel Partner Network

Dispel is happy to provide this as a service through its partner network, should the customer not already have a working solution.

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-007-6 Table R5 - System Access Controls.

Part

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

5.1-3

(5.1) “Have a method(s) to enforce authentication of interactive user access, where technically feasible.

(5.2) “Identify and inventory all known enabled default or other generic account types, either by system, by groups of systems, by location, or by system type(s).

(5.3) “Identify individuals who have authorized access to shared accounts.”

Dispel console, multi-factor authentication, virtual desktops, disposable components

The Dispel Dashboard allows administrators to enforce access rights, segment what is visible to each user, and require multi-factor authentication. Additionally, the Dashboard can manage virtual desktops, provision virtual desktops to third parties, and remove desktop access by destroying the desktop once the work is completed.

Please see Visual 6C for reference

5.4-7

(5.4) “Change known default passwords, per Cyber Asset capability.”

(5.5) “For password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce the following password parameters: 5.5.1. Password length that is, at least, the lesser of eight characters or the maximum length supported by the Cyber Asset; and 5.5.2. Minimum password complexity that is the lesser of three or more different types of characters (e.g., uppercase alphabetic, lowercase alphabetic, numeric, non-alphanumeric) or the maximum complexity supported by the Cyber Asset.”

(5.6) “Where technically feasible, for password-only authentication for interactive user access, either technically or procedurally enforce password changes or an obligation to change the password at least once every 15 calendar months.”

(5.7) “Where technically feasible, either: Limit the number of unsuccessful authentication attempts; or Generate alerts after a threshold of unsuccessful authentication attempts.”

AD integration, Dispel password requirements

For those who are not using an AD integration, Dispel’s password strength requirements are: at least 8 characters, 1 number, 1 uppercase, and 1 special character. Dispel does not allow more than six unsuccessful login attempts.

Wicket ESI whitelist allowing only specific IP addresses/ranges

Example of Moving Target Defense, ensuring your network access is never static
Example of Dispel Console feature: launch and destroy virtual desktops

Part

Purpose

Sections and Standards

Requirement 1

Table R1 - Ports and Services

Requirement

Requirement 2

Table R2 - Security Patch Management

Requirement 3

Table R3 - Malicious Code Prevention

Requirement 4

Table R4 - Security Event Monitoring

Requirement 5

Table R5 - System Access Controls

Visual References

6A (Section 1.1)

6B (Section 3.1)

6C (Section 5.1-3)

When properly installed, a Dispel Wicket ESI acts as the exclusive point of entry to an ICS network; only affords an authenticated user with access to a whitelisted subset of devices; and, rejects all inbound communications, reaching out instead to establish a link to the MTD SD-WAN. Dispel's Virtual Desktops can be outfitted with Screen Recording. Moreover, only authenticated users with a tool capable of finding an entrance to the correct MTD SD-WAN can even begin the process of reaching a Dispel Wicket ESI. These factors, collectively, meet the characteristics of a firewall as provided within section 5.3. However, Dispel would strongly recommend the implementation of at least one independent Layer 3 and Layer 4 firewall ahead of, and at least one Layer 7 firewall behind, any Dispel Wicket ESI.

A Dispel Wicket ESI acts as the exclusive point of entry to an ICS network; only affords an authenticated user with access to a whitelisted subset of devices; and, rejects all inbound communications, reaching out instead to establish a VPN to the MTD SD-WAN through which an authenticated user can reach the Wicket ESI.

Dispel is typically deployed into environments that already have network topologies mapping to 5.5.2, 5.5.3, 5.5.4, or 5.5.5. The placement of the Dispel Wicket ESI is variable based upon what subsystems the customer desires to remotely access.

When placing Dispel within the context of the Control Systems Security Program NCCIC/ICS-CERT "Control Systems Cyber Security: Defense in Depth Strategies" recommended architecture, please treat Dispel as an MTD SD-WAN sitting on a time-dependent DMZ for use by remote operators and business peers.

While this section largely is oriented towards Layer 3, 4, or 7 firewalls, it bears repeating that the Dispel Wicket ESI prevents all inbound connection attempts, proactively reaches out to establish a connection with the relevant MTD SD-WAN; and employs whitelisting to give authorized users access to relevant connected ICS devices.

How Dispel Fits

All of the connections made into a Dispel Wicket ESI are done through a VPN. The specific services addressed by 5.8 are frequently observed inside of the perimeter of Dispel customer networks, but none are engaged as a means of transmitting through the Dispel system.

Natting frequently takes place before data reaches the Dispel Wicket ESI. However, Dispel does not participate in this process.

A Dispel Wicket ESI acts as the exclusive point of entry to an ICS network; only affords an authenticated user with access to a whitelisted subset of devices; and, rejects all inbound communications, reaching out instead to establish a VPN to the MTD SD-WAN through which a user can reach the Wicket ESI after authenticating using a multi-factor authentication mechanism (typically a temporary one time password). As part of the access process, users typically are required by Dispel's customers to perform a second authentication at the Control Network Firewall prior to interacting with the relevant ICS system. This second authentication step brings the remote access process fully into alignment with the recommendations of section 5.10.12.

Dispel can implement unidirectional gateways into ICS remote access deployments. Typically, however, they are already embedded into the environments Dispel is engaged to afford remote access to.

Dispel, when properly deployed, is the single means of accessing an ICS system remotely. While Dispel certainly hopes that its system will continue to work so long as large portions of the Internet remain functional, we work with our customers to develop viable fallback plans, often in the form of independent medium (telephone) communications to on-site or physically proximate personnel.

From a deployment resiliency perspective, Dispel recommends a mixed redundancy model at both a network and hardware level, budget permitting.

Dispel does not assist with this subsection.

By wrapping the ICS system in a Moving Target Defense network, Dispel prevents attackers from locating the communication channel through which the ICS system can be accessed. Transmissions through a Dispel MTD SD-WAN are double wrapped with AES-256 using independent 4096 bit keys for the initial key exchange, reducing the risk of an attacker delivering correctly parsable data to the target. Finally, Dispel MTD SD-WANs use servers from multiple global cloud providers, often traversing virtual machines serviced by multiple hypervisors. This approach further reduces the risk of an attacker successfully consuming the network in a mass hyperjacking event, breaking AES-256, and acting as the intermediary.

Dispel has, generally, been agnostic to the type of authentication methodology selected by its customers - finding it easier for everyone to tie into pre-existing Active Directory and LDAP structures as well as whatever multi-factor authentication tool the customer already uses.

Dispel affords customers with the ability to live stream the activities of users to a supervisor's screen for real-time monitoring. An alternative, associated, option offered by Dispel involves screen recording all connected users' actions for auditing. All of the components of a Dispel network speak syslog and their records can be streamed to the monitoring system of a customer's choice.

Dispel MTD SD-WANs are composed of virtual machines that, from time-to-time, are replaced with fresh components. This embedded process of self-destruction and renewal affords Dispel networks with a unique level of resiliency to regional disruptions.

However, in the context of 5.17, perhaps the most valuable aspect of Dispel's system is its comprehensive logging of activity. As a consequence of Dispel MTD SD-WANs being single-tenant and, in ICS remote access deployments, single-purpose, Incident Response teams are able to view these networks as hyper-quiet, reducing the ground that must be covered to find an attacker.

Introduction

Section 5.1 | Network Segmentation and Segregation

How Dispel Fits

Section 5.2 | Boundary Protection

How Dispel Fits

5.3 | Firewalls

How Dispel Fits

5.4 | Logically Separated Control Network

How Dispel Fits

5.5 | Network Segregation

How Dispel Fits

5.6 | Recommended Defense in Depth Architecture

How Dispel Fits

5.7 | General Firewall Policies for ICS

How Dispel Fits

5.8 | Recommended Firewall Rules For Specific Services

5.9 | Network Address Translation (NAT)

How Dispel Fits

5.10.12 | Remote Support Access

How Dispel Fits

5.11 | Unidirectional Gateways

How Dispel Fits

5.12 | Single Points of Failure

How Dispel Fits

5.13 | Redundancy and Fault Tolerance

5.14 | Preventing Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

How Dispel Fits

5.15 | Authentication and Authorization

How Dispel Fits

5.16 | Monitoring, Logging, and Auditing

How Dispel Fits

5.17 | Incident Detection, Response, and System Recovery

How Dispel Fits

WITAF #503

Remote Access & Process Control System Security Guidance for the Water Sector

To get Dispel's complete mapping, download our document here:

Dispel - Remote Access & Process Control System Security Guidance for the Water Sector.pdf
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Introduction

The American Water Works Association’s Process Control System Security Guidance for the Water Sector (WITAF #503, shortened here to Security Guidance) provides a guide for members of the water industry seeking voluntary adoption of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) and adherence to Executive Order 13636 Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity. The Water Sector Coordinating Council, the USEPA and NIST have recognized the AWWA Security Guidance as the foundation of a voluntary, sector-specific approach to implementing the NIST Cybersecurity Framework.

Released by the American Water Works Association (AWWA) in early 2014, Security Guidance was designed to make the NIST CSF’s complete—but highly generalized—framework actionable for water utility chief information security officers, general managers, and utility directors seeking to reduce vulnerabilities in process control systems.

How it works

The Security Guidance focuses on how a utility uses their process control systems. Acting as a guided tool, the result provides a means of self-evaluating for how a utility could better manage cyber risks.

Covering 82 cybersecurity controls, Security Guidance determines under which circumstances a utility might need to implement new cybersecurity practices and technologies. Risks are priorities on a severity scale of 1-4—where a 1 denotes immediate action necessary, while a 4 means an issue is important, but not critical.

What Security Guidance is not

The AWWA designed Security Guidance to help the water sector adopt the NIST CSF through water-industry specific courses of action. The Guidance is not itself a cybersecurity framework. For those interested in water security frameworks, there exists the ANSI/AWWA G430-14 Security Practices for Operations & Management, ANSI/AWWA J100-10(R13) Risk & Resilience Management of Water & Wastewater Systems, and ANSI/AWWA G440-11 Emergency Preparedness Practices.

In addition to adopting the NIST CSF, water and wastewater utilities must also address §2013 of America’s Water Infrastructure Act (AWIA) of 2018.

The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also provides two resources: the (VSAT), and the (WHEAT).

There are 12 areas referred to as “Practice Categories” covered in the Security Guidance. The descriptions below are taken directly from the Security Guidance:

This category is concerned with the management and executive control of the security systems of the organization; it is associated with defining organizational boundaries and establishing a framework of security policies, procedures, and systems to manage the confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA) of the organization. One of the key components of system governance is developing and maintaining an accurate, up-to date inventory of PCS components.

From the perspective of long-term security, this is the most important category because it creates a managed process for increasing security. It also engages the executive team by including security risks as an important part of the management of the enterprise. Although this category of recommendations represents an essential part of an organization’s security posture, the related cybersecurity controls have been assigned a slightly lower priority in order to emphasize actionable recommendations that can have significant short-term effects.

This category is concerned with ensuring that the control system continues running even when faults occur and with fast recovery after disruptions in service.

Business Continuity Planning is a structured method for an organization to prepare for and reduce the probability and impact of systems and operational failure. A key component of Business Continuity Planning is the Disaster Recovery Plan, which deals with longer disruptions from more impactful events.

Both plans require a managed process that identifies potentially disruptive events, estimates their impact, and then develops and monitors mitigation strategies.

This category is concerned with securing servers and workstations against cyber-attacks; it identifies best practices to minimize the probability 4 of unauthorized access to servers, and to maintain the CIA properties of the servers and the systems within them. For example, this category includes whitelisting which restricts the applications that are allowed to run in servers and workstations throughout the enterprise.

This category is concerned with ensuring that only authorized personnel can access computing resources within the organization; it pertains to best practices for restricting access to computing resources and information to authorized users. For example, Single Sign On (SSN) is an access control mechanism that requires users to sign on only once; the SSN system can then use those credentials to control access to a variety of applications. However, care should be taken to ensure that different passwords are used to access PCS systems that those used to access enterprise systems.

This category is concerned with ensuring that computer programs do only what they are supposed to do; for example, suppose that a module of a SCADA system is supposed to receive data from a PLC and save it. Application security contains best practices to ensure that the module is not susceptible to buffer-overflow attacks and that the data it receives does not get corrupted as it is handled by the module.

Application Security is a complex and extensive area involving the design, implementation, and testing of program modules as well as the testing and monitoring of integrated systems after implementation. Utilities should develop standard design and implementation requirements that define the testing required by software vendors and system integrators, as well as doing their own testing of the integrity of results.

This category is concerned with ensuring that only appropriate encryption schemes are used within an organization’s security systems and that the cryptography is used wherever it is needed. For example, there is general confusion of what is an appropriate encryption scheme: sometimes packing or compression algorithms are called encryption. Also, cryptographic systems must be used wherever they are needed, for example, if the data will be traveling on a public channel or via a wireless circuit, or if there is a need to provide non-repudiation of a message or a document (by using a cryptographic signature).

Weak encryption schemes are particularly dangerous because they provide little protection and create a false sense of security and complacency. Proprietary encryption schemes should be avoided since they typically have not gone through comprehensive testing and often contain flaws. Also, only encryption schemes that are referenced by appropriate standards and use keys of proper length should be considered secure.

This category is concerned with the security of the network infrastructure from the data connector on the wall to the enterprise switches, routers, and firewalls. This includes the physical security of the cables, the telecom closets, and the computer rooms and the protection of the data as it travels on public channels and wireless circuits. Spam filtering and website blocking are also included in this category.

The focus of this category is establishing a layered defense architecture with the PCS network at its core. It also addresses adherence to new standards for PCS network security, particularly network topology requirements within the vicinity of PCS systems and PLC controls. Another area addressed in this category is network management, including port level security.

Physical security is a basic requirement for all PCS Systems. Once physical access to a network device or server is achieved, compromising equipment or systems is usually a trivial matter. The recommended practices in this category focus 5 on preventing and restricting physical access to only authorized personnel with a need to perform some action on the hardware. The recommendations in this group are also related to monitoring, detecting, and responding to unauthorized physical access.

This category is concerned with the definition and management of contracts that specify services requirements to the organization. The contract manager under the direction of the executive team is responsible to define, negotiate, execute, and monitor these contracts to ensure appropriate service delivery to the organization.

An SLA is a contract which requires minimum levels of performance for services provided. For example, the Committed Information Rate (CIR) is part of a typical Wide-Area Network (WAN) services SLA and specifies the minimum bandwidth that a data circuit may have.

SLAs for PCS network systems typically focus on quality of service (QoS) rather than bandwidth. PCS systems do not require high bandwidth but cannot operate properly if the bandwidth falls below certain known thresholds.

OPSEC is concerned with refining operational procedures and workflows to increase the security properties (CIA) of an organization. For example, a utility may want to restrict what employees post on their Facebook pages about the organization’s security procedures. OPSEC also includes access granting policies and procedures, security guard rotation schedules, backup recovery procedures, etc.

This category is concerned with bringing security awareness to the employees, clients, and service providers of the organization.

Education involves identifying best practices and providing formal training on the security policies and procedures of the enterprise as well as security awareness and incident response. It involves test practice of the key security processes and actions to ensure quick and accurate response to security incidents within the enterprise.

This category is concerned with the personal safety of employees, clients, contractors, and the general public.

Personnel security starts as part of the hiring process and ends after the employee leaves the organization. It handles periodic reaccreditation of employees and updates of the policies and procedures that govern staff. The purpose of personnel security is to ensure the safety and integrity of staff within the organization. Personnel security also applies to external contractors and service personnel, with the objective to ensure appropriate, lower privileged access to facilities.

3.3

“For those methods identified in Part 3.1 that use signatures or patterns, have a process for the update of the signatures or patterns. The process must address testing and installing the signatures or patterns.

Traffic log data

In reference to 3.1, if Dispel has embedded a Layer 7 firewall into its network, new patterns are passed to it according to the specifications of the firewall vendor.

Security Guidance sections

1. Governance and Risk Management

2. Business Continuity and Disaster Recovery

3. Server and Workstation Hardening

4. Access Control

5. Application Security

6. Encryption

7. Telecommunications, Network Security, and Architecture

8. Physical Security of PCS Equipment

9. Service Level Agreements (SLA)

10. Operations Security (OPSEC)

11. Education

12. Personnel Security

Drinking Water or Wastewater Utility Risk Assessment Vulnerability Self-Assessment Tool
Water Health and Economic Analysis Tool

NERC-CIP Overview

A NERC-CIP walkthrough and Dispel mapping of product offerings.

What is NERC-CIP?

The North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) administers a Critical Infrastructure Protection program (CIP), which details the security requirements for any cyber assets considered "critical" to the North American electricity grid.

CIP compliance is mandatory, and enforcement is achieved through self-reporting, audits, and investigations by NERC.

What do all these sections mean?

Within CIP, each section focuses on a different area, and each section is currently on a different version. The naming convention is CIP-[section]-[version].

Dispel Highlight

Dispel helps organizations in all Cyber-related sections. Dispel fulfills functionality relating to network and user security. For all sections, Dispel provides reports, inventories, and change logs supporting the monitoring requirements wherever relevant.

The following pages detail each requirement and corresponding Dispel feature where applicable in the Cyber sections. An Additional Sections page can be found containing summaries of the Physical and Management sections.

CIP-005-5 Electronic Security Perimeters

CIP-007-6 System Security Management

CIP-011-2 Information Protection

CIP-002-5.1, CIP-003-7, CIP-004-6, CIP-008-6, CIP-009-6, CIP-010-2

Section

Categorization

Currently Enforceable Standards

Future Enforcement

CIP-002

Management

CIP-002-5.1a BES Cyber System Categorization

CIP-003

Management

CIP-003-7 Security Management Controls

CIP-003-8

CIP-004

Management

CIP-004-6 Personnel & Training

✔

CIP-005

Cyber

CIP-005-5 Electronic Security Perimeters

CIP-005-6

CIP-006

Physical

CIP-006-6 Physical Security of BES Cyber Systems

✔

CIP-007

Cyber

CIP-007-6 System Security Management

CIP-008

Management

CIP-008-5 Incident Reporting and Response Planning

CIP-008-6

CIP-009

Management

CIP-009-6 Recovery Plans for BES Cyber Systems

CIP-010

Management

CIP-010-2 Configuration Change Management and Vulnerability Assessments

CIP-010-3

✔

CIP-011

Cyber

CIP-011-2 Information Protection

✔

CIP-012

Cyber

N/A

CIP-012-1 Communications between Control Centers

✔

CIP-013

Cyber

N/A

CIP-013-1 Supply Chain Risk Management

CIP-014

Physical

CIP-014-2 Physical Security

How does Dispel help my organization align to NERC-CIP standards?

CIP-005-5
CIP-007-6
CIP-011-2
Additional Sections

Protect

Identity Management, Authentication, and Access Control (PR.AC)

NIST Definition: Access to physical and logical assets and associated facilities is limited to authorized users, processes, and devices, and is managed consistent with the assessed risk of unauthorized access to authorized activities and transactions.

Section

How Dispel Helps

PR.AC-1

Identities and credentials are issued, managed, verified, revoked, and audited for authorized devices, users and processes.

Dispel systems can provide strong identity and authentication such as multi-factor authentication overlay even to legacy systems. Dispel provides simple methods for auditing/revoking authorized users/systems.

PR.AC-3

Remote access is managed.

Dispel infrastructure provides a simple and secure system for remote access, enforces multi-factor authentication, and enforces the use of organization controlled systems—virtual machines, which are auditable, monitored, and recorded.

NIST Definition: The organization’s personnel and partners are provided cybersecurity awareness education and are trained to perform their cybersecurity-related duties and responsibilities consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.

NIST Definition: Information and records (data) are managed consistent with the organization’s risk strategy to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information.

NIST Definition: Security policies (that address purpose, scope, roles, responsibilities, management commitment, and coordination among organizational entities), processes, and procedures are maintained and used to manage protection of information systems and assets.

NIST Definition: Maintenance and repairs of industrial control and information system components are performed consistent with policies and procedures.

NIST Definition: Technical security solutions are managed to ensure the security and resilience of systems and assets, consistent with related policies, procedures, and agreements.

PR.AC-4

Access permissions and authorizations are managed, incorporating the principles of least privilege and separation of duties.

Dispel systems can provide segmentation and limit access to only designated systems. Dispel’s Enclave Networks are built upon principles of Zero-Trust and Least Privilege.

Section

How Dispel Helps

PR.AT-1

All users are informed and trained.

For admins, Dispel’s personnel provide training and onboarding. For users, Dispel’s systems are designed to aid in automatic security enforcement through the user onboarding process.

PR.AT-2

Privileged users understand their roles and responsibilities.

Dispel’s systems are designed to aid in automatic security enforcement, based upon the principles of least privilege, segmentation, and zero trust. Clear roles and responsibilities are established for all user types.

Section

How Dispel Works

PR.DS-1

Data-at-rest is protected.

Data stored can be encrypted at rest.

PR.DS-2

Data-in-transit is protected.

All data flowing through Dispel systems are end-to-end encrypted with two layers of AES-256 with 4096-bit RSA.

PR.DS-4

Adequate capacity to ensure availability is maintained.

Dispel can provide rapid scaling of systems based on demand. This includes hot or warm redundancy to ensure availability.

PR.DS-5

Protections against data leaks are implemented.

Dispel provides strong segmentation, encryption, reduction of access and removal of public access to ports and IP addresses. Further, Dispel’s Enclaves are protected against DNS, IPv4, IPv6, and WebRTC leaks.

Section

How Dispel Works

PR.IP-1

A baseline configuration of information technology/industrial control systems.

Dispel networks segment ICS systems so that access is granted to systems only-as-needed.

PR.IP-6

Data is destroyed according to policy.

Dispel’s platform allows for the full destruction of Enclave Networks–removing the required associated data according to policy.

PR.IP-7

Protection Processes are removed.

Dispel networks and resources automatically launch with the latest patches, aiding in improving protection processes as they are developed. Dispel’s platform enforces least privilege and temporary access for remote users.

PR.IP-11

Cybersecurity is included in human resources practices (e.g. deprovisioning, personnel screening).

Dispel helps link cybersecurity with HR practices by integrating with the AD, and by creating fully disposable networks that can cycle with user involvement. Finally, Dispel’s simple onboarding procedure enables a non-technical admin/workforce.

Section

How Dispel Works

PR.MA-1

Maintenance and repair of organizational assets are performed and logged, with approved and controlled tools.

Dispel systems are patched automatically, and can be refreshed in under 30 min. Dispel’s remote access platform allows the organization to control/audit how vendors/partners gain access to update their critical infrastructure.

PR.MA-2

Remote maintenance of organizational assets is approved, logged, and performed in a manner that prevents unauthorized access.

Dispel infrastructure provides simple and secure system for remote access, enforces multi-factor authentication, and enforces use of organization controlled system – virtual machines, which are auditable, monitored, and recorded.

Section

How Dispel Works

PR.PT-1

Audit/log records are determined, documented, implemented, and reviewed in accordance with policy.

Dispel’s traffic logging aids in documenting log records for audit.

PR.PT-3

The principle of least functionality is incorporated by configuring systems to provide only essential capabilities.

Dispel systems can provide, read or view only access, as well as provide one way push of data. All of Dispel’s virtual infrastructure is built according to the principle of least functionality.

PR.PT-4

Communications and control networks are protected.

Dispel can segment communications and control networks, as well as provide off channel and backup communication channels.

PR.PT-5

Mechanisms (e.g. failsafe, load balancing, hot swap) are implemented to achieve resilience requirements in normal and adverse situations.

Dispel can segment communications and control networks, as well as provide off channel and backup communication channels. Full hot-swappable network redundancy can be configured.

Awareness and Training (PR.AT)

Data Security (PR.DS)

Information Protection (PR.IP)

Maintenance (PR.MA)

Protective Technology (PR.PT)

PR.DS-6

Integrity checking mechanisms are used to verify software, firmware, and information integrity.

When launching, Dispel systems check to make sure VDIs and networks are running as needed, and destroys/re-builds if not. All of Dispel’s virtual machines are built with the latest security updates and patches.

CIP-005-5

Cyber Security - Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

Purpose

To manage electronic access to BES Cyber Systems by specifying a controlled Electronic Security Perimeter in support of protecting BES Cyber Systems against compromise that could lead to misoperation or instability in the BES.

In plain English, CIP-005 outlines what an Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) must look like in order to sufficiently protect cyber systems, and access to such systems. A successful ESP acts as the first layer of defense in network-level attacks, aiming to limit reconnaissance, prohibit traffic, and limit the scope of any successful attacks.

Sections and Standards

There are two requirements in CIP-005, with applicable requirement parts presented in tables. Below, the contents of each requirement are reproduced under "Part" and "Requirement." "Product/Feature" indicates which Dispel product helps an organization comply to this requirement, and "Technical Supplement" details how this compliance is achieved.

Requirement 1

Each responsible Entity shall implement one or more documented processes that collectively include each of the applicable requirement parts in CIP-005-5 Table R1 - Electronic Security Perimeter.

Table R1 - Electronic Security Perimeter

Each Responsible Entity allowing Interactive Remote Access to BES Cyber Systems shall implement one or more document processes that collectively include the applicable requirement parts, where technically feasible, in CIP-005-5 Table R2 - Interactive Remote Access Management.

Part

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

1.1

“All applicable Cyber Assets connected to a network via a routable protocol shall reside within a defined Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP).”

Wicket ESI, whitelisting

A Dispel Wicket ESI acts as both the ESP and EAP (Electronic Access Point) for cyber assets. To be accessible, a cyber asset must be deliberately assigned to a whitelist by an Administrator.

Please see Visual 5A for reference

1.2

“All External Routable Connectivity must be through an identified Electronic Access Point (EAP).”

Wicket ESI

Dispel’s Wicket ESIs act as network EAPs. As part of the installation process, Dispel and the customer conduct a network audit to confirm that all outbound traffic must pass through the Wicket ESI.

1.3

“Require inbound and outbound access permissions, including the reason for granting access, and deny all other access by default.”

Part

Requirement

Product/Feature

Technical Supplement

2.1

“Utilize an Intermediate System such that the Cyber Asset initiating Interactive Remote Access does not directly access an applicable Cyber Asset.”

Virtual desktops, automatic updating and patching

Dispel’s Virtual Desktops, which are spun up in Regions and assigned by Administrators, act as the Intermediate System. Virtual Desktops ensure that all computers accessing cyber assets are in the Administrator’s control.

Please see Visual 5B for reference

2.2

“For all Interactive Remote Access sessions, utilize encryption that terminates at an Intermediate System.”

End-to-end encryption, Enclave

All traffic drops out of an encrypted state at the Virtual Desktop used as the Intermediate System.

Requirement 2

Table R2 - Interactive Remote Access Management

Visual References

5A (Section 1.1)

5B (Section 2.1)

5C (Section 2.3)

Example of whitelisting: Only allowed servers are accessible through each Wicket.
Virtual desktops ensure that third party devices never directly access cyber asset endpoints.
Dispel multi-factor authentication as seen in the Dispel Console.

Dispel console, proactive access management portal, LDAP Integration, Wicket

Inbound access permissions can be toggled by administrators through the Dispel Dashboard. Assigning users to Regions and Facilities for access is a proactive process, and can be made contingent upon a prior manual approval step. Outbound access is rarely needed, in practice, but can be activated by an administrator on a case by case basis on the Wicket ESI.

Depending upon the situation at the customer site, Dispel will either tie to a pre-existing LDAP system reflecting the appropriate access permissioning process or provide the customer with a custom form approval process embedded in the Dispel web portal.

1.4

“Where technically feasible, perform authentication when establishing Dial-up Connectivity with applicable Cyber Assets.”

Identity controller, multi-factor authentication, Enclave, Wicket

Dispel Wickets, the network EAPs for connected cyber assets, perform authentication while connecting through any backhaul, including dial-up.

1.5

“Have one or more methods for detecting known or suspected malicious communications for both inbound and outbound communications.”

Traffic logging, hyper-quiet network segmentation

All of the components in a Dispel network speak syslog and can be tied back to a SEIM. As an observation, Dispel remote access networks are both single-tenant and, in ICS settings, single-purpose which makes them hyper-quiet. While most customers choose to place Dispel’s Wickets ahead of their pre-existing security stack, Dispel can also embed Layer 7 firewalls in the virtual networks provided by any of the major commercial cloud providers.

2.3

“Require multi-factor authentication for all Interactive Remote Access sessions.”

Multi-factor authentication, temporary one time passwords, hardware tokens, AD integration

Dispel’s networks come with user access controls which support and enforce multi-factor authentication through either Temporary One Time Password or Hardware Tokens.

Please see Visual 5C for reference

Medium Impact BCS

Dispel’s Zero Trust Engine mapped to NERC CIP Medium controls to support audit-ready compliance.

This guide is for informational purposes only. Dispel does not intend the information or recommendations in this guide to constitute legal advice. Each customer is responsible for independently evaluating its own particular use of the services as appropriate to support its legal and security compliance obligations.

Overview

At Medium Impact, Dispel usually shows up in your NERC CIP program as:

  • An Electronic Access Control and Monitoring System (EACMS) for BES Cyber Systems

  • Sometimes also a Protected Cyber Asset (PCA) / jump host component

  • A major source of access control + logging evidence for auditors

These primarily reside within the CIP-004, -005, -007, and -010 control families. In this document, we'll cover the following for each:

  1. What the standard wants at Medium.

  2. How Dispel typically aligns.

  3. What auditors actually expect to see.


CIP-004 focuses on who has access to BES Cyber Systems and BCSI, and whether they’re vetted and trained. Requirements are structured as documented processes plus evidence in Tables R1–R4 (security awareness, training, personnel risk assessments, access management, plus BCSI access) for Medium/High impact and associated PACS/EACMS.

Dispel does not own CIP-004 for you, but it’s a key data source and control point:

  • Role-based access control (RBAC):

    • Dispel Zero Trust Engine (ZTE) enforces least-privilege roles/groups tied to BES Cyber Systems and sites.

    • This supports your documented “who is authorized for cyber access to what” under CIP-004 R4 (Access Management).

  • Strong identity + MFA:

For CIP-004, auditors will want to see your governance artifacts first, with Dispel used as technical evidence:

  • Documented processes:

    • Security awareness program, role-based training program, PRA process, and access management procedures explicitly including vendor/remote access.

  • Training & PRA evidence (you, not Dispel):

    • Training records (LMS exports), PRA completion logs, job role to training mapping.

Think of Dispel as: “the system we point to when we show auditors that the access we approved on paper is what actually exists in production.”


CIP-005 manages cyber access into the Electronic Security Perimeter (ESP) and increases controls for interactive remote access and vendor remote access. Requirements include:

  • R1 – ESP & access points: Define ESP and all access points to BES Cyber Systems.

  • R2 – Remote access management: Strong control for interactive remote access and (now) all remote access, with auth, encryption, jump hosts, and logging.

This is where Dispel is front-and-center.

Dispel ZTE typically functions as an EACMS that enforces CIP-005:

  • Electronic access control / perimeter enforcement (R1):

    • ZTE sits at the boundary of your OT networks and enforces connectivity via micro-segmented, policy-driven tunnels.

    • Per-asset or per-zone policies effectively define and enforce your ESP access points for remote users.

  • Interactive Remote Access (IRA) & vendor RA (R2):

For CIP-005 with Dispel in scope, expect auditors to ask for:

  1. ESP / EACMS diagrams

    • Network diagrams showing where Dispel sits relative to Medium BCS, firewalls, and PACS.

  2. Documented process referencing Dispel:

    • Formal “Electronic Access Control and Monitoring” / “Remote Access Management” procedure that:


CIP-007 specifies technical and operational security controls: system hardening, patching, malware protection, account management, logging, and so on, for BES Cyber Systems and applicable EACMS/PACS/PCAs.

Key buckets:

  • R1 – System hardening (ports, services, default accounts)

  • R2 – Patch management

  • R3 – Malicious code prevention

  • R4 – Security event logging

For CIP-007, Dispel is in scope for the systems we operate (ZTE infrastructure, jump hosts, gateways) as EACMS/PCAs; your BES Cyber Systems and other hosts remain your responsibility.

Typical alignment:

  • R1 – Hardening:

    • Dispel-managed gateways and jump hosts run with minimal exposed services, locked-down management access, and hardened OS images.

    • Protocol allow-lists and micro-segmentation rules limit traffic paths into BCS.

  • R2 – Patch management:

When Dispel is in scope for CIP-007, auditors will ask:

  • System inventory & applicability:

    • Which Dispel components are considered EACMS/PCAs supporting Medium BES Cyber Systems?

  • Hardening documentation:

    • A standard build / hardening guide for Dispel-managed nodes (closed ports, disallowed services).


CIP-010-4 aims to prevent and detect unauthorized changes by requiring: baseline configurations, change management, configuration monitoring, and vulnerability assessments for BES Cyber Systems and applicable EACMS/PACS/PCAs.

Main themes:

  • R1 – Baseline configuration & change management

  • R2 – Configuration monitoring (detecting deviations)

  • R3 – Vulnerability assessments (periodic and triggered by major changes)

For Dispel, think of CIP-010 as governing ZTE configuration and infrastructure that controls your remote access:

  • Baselines for Dispel components (R1):

    • Defined “golden” configuration for:

      • Gateways / nodes

      • Policy sets (who can connect where, over what protocol)

For CIP-010 with Dispel as EACMS:

  • Baseline documentation:

    • A configuration baseline that includes:

      • Software/firmware versions

      • Enabled services


CIP Requirement
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Dispel Responsibility
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CIP Requirement
Customer Responsibility
Dispel Responsibility
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Dispel Responsibility
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CIP Requirement
Customer Responsibility
Dispel Responsibility
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Dispel Responsibility
Shared Responsibility

Central identity, MFA, and per-user accounts help prove that only trained/authorized individuals can gain interactive remote access.

  • Access review support:

    • ZTE can export user/role/asset mappings and historical access logs to feed your periodic CIP-004 access reviews and recertifications.

  • BCSI access:

    • If you store configs or diagrams inside Dispel-hosted jump hosts or file shares, then Dispel’s auth controls/logging become part of BCSI access control (R6).

  • Access management evidence where Dispel helps:

    • User list from Dispel (showing BES-relevant roles)

    • Example access approval tickets granting access that matches Dispel roles

    • Access recertification reports using Dispel exports

    • Evidence of timely revocation (user removed in HR system → disabled in IdP → removed from Dispel group)

    MFA + unique accounts for each user (no shared “vendor” accounts).

  • Encrypted tunnels end-to-end (TLS/VPN), satisfying requirement for strong encryption. TDi+1

  • Intermediate/jump systems: Users connect into a Dispel jump host/session first, then to BES Cyber Systems, aligning with “intermediate system” expectations in IRA guidance. TDi

  • Granular policy: Rules restricting which BES systems/protocols each user, vendor, or role can touch.

  • Session logging/recording: Central logs (and often full session replays) for all remote access into ESP.

  • Monitoring and alerting on access:

    • Central logging of connection attempts, failures, and disconnects to feed your SIEM and satisfy CIP-005 monitoring expectations.

  • Names Dispel as the required path for IRA/vendor RA

  • States MFA requirement

  • Describes use of jump hosts / intermediate systems

  • Describes logging and retention.

  • Config & policy evidence from Dispel:

    • Screenshots or exports showing:

      • MFA enforcement and identity source

      • Role-to-asset mapping or access policies

      • Example vendor access configuration and expiration controls.

  • Log and session evidence:

    • Sample remote access log entries demonstrating:

      • Who connected

      • From where

      • When

      • To which asset

    • If available, a session recording demonstrating oversight.

  • Change control linkage:

    • A couple of example changes to Dispel rules tied to your change tickets (this is where CIP-005 and CIP-010 start to blur in practice).

  • R5 – User account management

    Dispel maintains a documented patch process for ZTE components and underlying OS packages (security updates prioritized, tested, and deployed within defined windows).

  • Customer view: you maintain patching for in-plant servers/BCS; Dispel provides attestation or reports for ZTE components.

  • R3 – Malicious code prevention:

    • Anti-malware and/or application control on Dispel jump hosts, plus restrictions on file transfer paths into BCS.

    • Ability to route traffic through inspection systems you manage (e.g., your AV/EDR stack).

  • R4 – Logging:

    • Dispel generates detailed event logs on:

      • Auth success/failure

      • Connection establishment/teardown

      • Policy violations

    • These can be shipped to your SIEM to meet “detect, alert, retain” expectations.

  • R5 – User access:

    • Centralized account lifecycle through SSO and MFA, role-based authorization, and periodic account review supported by exports.

  • Evidence that deployed systems match that standard (screenshots, configs).

  • Patch management proof:

    • A patching policy with SLAs for security updates.

    • Example patch reports or tickets showing updates to Dispel gateways/jump hosts.

  • Malware protection evidence:

    • Config screenshots/logs from AV/EDR on jump hosts (or documented technical rationale if compensated controls are used).

  • Logging & retention proof:

    • Config showing what’s logged and where logs go (local, SIEM).

    • Sample security events and how alerts are generated and triaged.

  • User account lifecycle:

    • Evidence that account creation/removal in Dispel follows your CIP-004 and corporate IAM processes (joiner/mover/leaver, periodic reviews).

  • Logging and auth settings

  • Dispel can expose config exports and/or architecture docs that define this baseline.

  • Change management (R1):

    • Change workflows for:

      • Adding/modifying access policies (e.g., new vendor access, new plant asset)

      • Upgrading Dispel software

    • These changes should be tied to your enterprise change system (ticket IDs, approvals).

  • Configuration monitoring (R2):

    • Audit trails showing who changed what and when inside Dispel (policy edits, role changes, device additions).

    • Integration with your monitoring/alerting stack so unexpected config changes on ZTE are visible quickly. spp.org+1

  • Vulnerability management (R3):

    • Dispel’s own vuln scanning and remediation program for ZTE, and/or your independent scans of the deployed components.

    • Treatment of vendor advisories and CVEs as “triggering events” that lead to assessments and updates.

  • Auth and logging settings

  • A defined set of security-relevant parameters for gateways/jump hosts. spp.org+1

  • Change records:

    • Examples where Dispel policies or components changed:

      • Change ticket

      • Risk assessment (if applicable)

      • Approvals

      • Implementation evidence (Dispel config diff, screenshots, or exports).

  • Monitoring evidence:

    • Logs or reports showing:

      • Configuration change events detected by Dispel or your monitoring tools

      • How unexpected/unauthorized changes would trigger an alert.

  • Vulnerability assessment proof:

    • Periodic vuln assessment / penetration test reports covering Dispel components in scope.

    • Documented remediation or risk acceptance and timelines.

  • Conduct PRA for personnel with cyber/BCSI access. Keep documentation.

    N/A

    N/A

    CIP-004-R4 Access Management

    Approve access, define roles, maintain access request records, ensure timely revocation.

    Enforce role-based access control (RBAC), MFA, and identity requirements within the Dispel platform. Provide audit logs/evidence.

    Access reviews performed using Dispel user/role reports.

    CIP-004-R6 BCSI Access Management

    Classify BCSI, maintain BCSI handling procedures.

    Provide access control and logging for BCSI stored or transiting within Dispel-controlled jump hosts or file paths.

    Customer ensures BCSI stored in Dispel follows their governance.

    Document IRA and vendor RA procedures, including MFA and intermediate system requirements.

    Provide MFA enforcement, encrypted tunnels, intermediate/jump systems, granular policy, full logging, session recording (when enabled).

    Both parties ensure remote users follow approved RA processes; customer maintains RA approvals.

    CIP-005-R2.2 Logging & Monitoring

    Define log review, incident response, and retention governance.

    Produce complete audit logs of connections, auth attempts, disconnections, and policy violations; export to SIEM.

    Customer reviews, correlates, and stores logs per retention schedule.

    Deploy and manage malware protection for BES Cyber Systems and internal jump hosts.

    Maintain malware defenses and application control for Dispel-managed jump hosts and endpoints.

    Where file transfer is used, both parties coordinate malware scanning.

    CIP-007-R4 Logging

    Define log review procedure, SIEM retention, and alerting workflow.

    Generate logs for auth events, remote access sessions, security events, and retain as configured. Support log export.

    Customer aggregates logs, correlates events, and maintains retention schedule.

    CIP-007-R5 Account Management

    Ensure user approvals, recertification, joiner/mover/leaver processes, and access removals.

    Enforce MFA, unique accounts, RBAC, disablement, and logging of changes within Dispel.

    Access reviews combine corporate IAM system with Dispel exports.

    Monitor configuration changes on BES Cyber Systems and customer EACMS.

    Log administrative/user policy changes, access control changes, and configuration modifications within Dispel. Provide alerting outputs.

    Customer reviews alerts and performs root cause analysis.

    CIP-010-R3 Vulnerability Assessments

    Conduct periodic and triggered VA on BES Cyber Systems and customer EACMS.

    Perform vulnerability scanning and remediation for Dispel components; provide reports/attestations.

    Customer includes Dispel infrastructure within their vendor-risk and CIP-013 processes.

    CIP-004-R1 Security Awareness

    Maintain documented program and provide annual training to personnel.

    N/A

    N/A

    CIP-004-R2 Training for Personnel with Access

    Ensure all users (internal + vendor) are trained before access is granted. Maintain training records.

    Provide materials describing Dispel’s system security features as needed for customer training.

    Customer validates that only trained personnel are provisioned in Dispel.

    CIP-005-R1 ESP & Access Points

    Identify BES Cyber Systems and define the ESP. Document all Electronic Access Points (EAPs).

    Provide ZTE (gateways, nodes, access controllers) as EACMS enforcing perimeter and controlling electronic access.

    Customer integrates network diagrams showing Dispel as exclusive remote access path into ESP.

    CIP-005-R1.2 Access Control

    Ensure governance and procedures exist for EA control.

    Enforce connection rules, protocol allow-lists, micro-segmentation, user-to-asset permissions.

    Customer validates Dispel rules align with approved access rights.

    CIP-007-R1 System Hardening

    Maintain hardening standards for BES Cyber Systems and customer-operated EACMS/PCAs.

    Maintain hardened configurations for Dispel-managed gateways, jump hosts, services, ports, logging, and OS security.

    Customer validates placement of Dispel components and ensures compensating controls meet policy.

    CIP-007-R2 Security Patch Management

    Maintain patch process for BES Cyber Systems; review vendor patches.

    Maintain patch program for Dispel components. Provide patching cadence documentation or attestation.

    Customer tracks changes to Dispel components through change management.

    CIP-010-R1 Baseline Configurations

    Maintain baseline configurations for BES Cyber Systems and customer-managed EACMS.

    Maintain Dispel-specific baselines for ZTE gateways, jump hosts, authentication settings, and logging parameters. Provide baseline documentation on request.

    Customer documents that Dispel components support the approved baseline and are tracked in asset inventory.

    CIP-010-R1 Change Management

    Maintain change documentation, approvals, risk assessments, and implementation evidence.

    Maintain change documentation for Dispel software updates and infrastructure modifications. Provide change evidence on request.

    Customer includes Dispel configuration policy changes within their enterprise change workflow (ticket linkage).

    CIP-011-R1 BCSI Protection

    Classify, label, and manage BCSI according to documented process.

    Provide access control and audit logging over BCSI stored or transferred inside Dispel jump hosts or remote access paths.

    Customer ensures BCSI in Dispel follows corporate handling and storage policies.

    CIP-011-R2 Secure Disposal

    Securely destroy BCSI in accordance with policy.

    Provide secure deletion options for Dispel-managed storage as applicable.

    Customer validates disposal actions.

    CIP-013-R1 Vendor Risk Management

    Maintain vendor-risk process, evaluate vendors, maintain contracts & SLAs.

    Maintain secure development lifecycle, vulnerability management, SOC 2/ISO certifications, and provide security documentation.

    Customer assures Dispel security posture meets procurement controls and risk acceptance thresholds.

    CIP-013-R2 Procurement Controls

    Include required language in contracts.

    Provide required security and notification obligations (e.g., incident response, patching notifications).

    Ensure bilateral responsibilities are contractually clear.

    Control Family Background

    CIP-004-7 – Cyber Security: Personnel & Training

    What CIP-004 wants (Medium BCS)

    How Dispel aligns

    What auditors typically expect

    CIP-005-7/-6 – Cyber Security: Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

    What CIP-005 wants (Medium BCS)

    How Dispel aligns

    What auditors typically expect

    CIP-007-6/-7 – Cyber Security: System Security Management

    What CIP-007 wants (Medium BCS)

    How Dispel aligns

    What auditors typically expect

    CIP-010-4 – Configuration Change Management & Vulnerability Assessments

    What CIP-010 wants (Medium BCS)

    How Dispel aligns

    What auditors typically expect

    Dispel Control Alignment Roles & Responsibilities

    Legend

    • Customer Responsibility: You own the control.

    • Dispel Responsibility: Dispel provides the technical control for its managed components.

    • Shared Responsibility: Both parties participate (e.g., customer governance + Dispel technical enforcement).

    CIP-004 — Personnel & Training

    CIP-005 — Electronic Security Perimeter(s)

    CIP-007 — System Security Management

    CIP-010 — Configuration Change Management & Vulnerability Assessments

    CIP-011 — Information Protection (Common Auditor Tie-In)

    CIP-013 — Supply Chain Cyber Security Risk Management (Always Asked for Vendor Controls)

    NERCipedia+1
    Western Electricity Coordinating Council+3NERC+3NERCipedia+3

    CIP-004-R3 Personnel Risk Assessment (PRA)

    CIP-005-R2 Remote Access Management

    CIP-007-R3 Malicious Code Prevention

    CIP-010-R2 Configuration Monitoring

    Vol. 3: Security Capabilities

    April 2021, Version 1.1

    Security Capabilities List

    The capabilities list is composed of two parts:

    • Universal Security Capabilities: Enterprise-level capabilities that outline guiding principles for TIC Use Cases.

    • Policy Enforcement Point Security Capabilities: Network-level capabilities that inform technical implementation for relevant use cases.

    The capabilities are intended to fulfill the TIC Objectives outlined in Security Objectives of TIC 3.0.

    You can find the April 2021 Version 1.1 of Volume 3 .

    Universal Security Capabilities

    Universal capabilities are enterprise-level capabilities that outline guiding principles for TIC Use Cases and apply across use cases. Agencies have the discretion to determine the level of rigor necessary for applying universal capabilities based on federal guidelines and risk tolerance. The table below provides: (1) a list of the universal security capabilities, (2) a description of each capability, and (3) areas where Dispel provides coverage and how we do so. While universal capabilities are broadly applicable, certain use cases may provide unique guidance on specific capabilities where necessary.

    Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) Capabilities are network-level capabilities that inform technical implementation for relevant use cases. PEP Capabilities are divided into eight groups and fulfilled by applications, devices, or services identified in TIC Use Cases and TIC Overlays. The eight PEP capability groups correspond to the following security functions. Dispel assists in the bold ones:

    • Email

    • Web

    The PEP capability groups listing is not exhaustive. Additional groups may be developed to reflect new use cases. The following tables provide: (1) a list of PEP capabilities, (2) a description of each capability, and (3) a mapping to relevant NIST CSF categories.

    Generally speaking, Dispel's services don't cover criteria in the Email, Web, DNS, or Intrusion Detection sections. We've therefore omitted them from this framework mapping.

  • Domain Name System (DNS)

  • Intrusion Detection

  • Covered

    Capability

    Description

    Dispel

    ✔

    Backup and Recovery

    Keeping copies of configuration and data, as needed, to allow for the quick restoration of service in the event of malicious incidents, system failures or corruption.

    Dispel Enclaves support multi-cloud provider and region hot standbys with auto-synced backups for fail-over and recovery.

    ✔

    Covered

    Capability

    Description

    Dispel

    ✔

    Anti-malware

    Anti-malware protections detect the presence of malicious code and facilitate its quarantine or removal.

    Linux Virtual Desktops are equipped with anti-malware detection. Windows desktops include Windows Defender.

    Content Disarm & Reconstruction

    Content Disarm & Reconstruction technology detects the presence of unapproved active content and facilitates its removal.

    Covered

    Capability

    Description

    Dispel

    ✔

    Network Access Controls

    Network Access Control protections prevent the ingest or transiting of unauthorized network traffic.

    IP table traffic routing within an Dispel Enclave's VPN structure dictates network access and egress.

    ✔

    IP Blacklisting

    IP Blacklisting protections prevent the ingest or transiting of traffic received from or destined to a blacklisted IP address.

    All Dispel egress nodes ("Exit Points") maintain blacklists. They are automatically populated by Spamhaus blacklists, and may also be configured.

    Covered

    Capability

    Description

    Dispel

    ✔

    DDoS Protections

    DDoS protections mitigate the effects of distributed denial of service attacks.

    Dispel provides flexible infrastructure to prevent data consumption in a DDoS attack. Enclaves can scale in size and scope of Entry Points. Network ingress points can alter their topology, providing an evasive attack surface. Enclave Entry Points can also block all traffic from suspicious IP addresses.

    In additional to Dispel's native architecture, the underlying cloud providers Dispel partners with also implement their own DDoS protections--including automation detection and response mechanisms.

    ✔

    Elastic Expansion

    Elastic expansion enables agencies to dynamically expand the resources available for services as conditions require.

    Dispel provides capacity ahead of demand provisioning with scheduled build times for scaling up and down virtual resources. For example, the number of Enclaves can increase at 7 AM when the workday starts, then decrease at 6 PM as the day ends.

    Covered

    Capability

    Description

    Dispel

    Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response (SOAR)

    Security Orchestration, Automation and Response tools define, prioritize and automate the response to security incidents.

    Shadow IT Detection

    Elastic expansion enables agencies to dynamically expand the resources available for services as conditions require.

    Covered

    Capability

    Description

    Dispel

    ✔

    Identity Verification

    Identity verification ensures that access to the virtual meeting is limited to appropriate individuals. Waiting room features, where the meeting host authorizes vetted individuals to join the meeting, can also be utilized.

    Dispel's video conferencing tool

    ✔

    Encrypted Communication

    Communication between virtual meeting participants and any data exchanged is encrypted at rest and in transit. Some UCC offerings support end-to-end encryption, where encryption is performed on the clients and can only be decrypted by the other authenticated participants and cannot be decrypted by the UCC vendor.

    Covered

    Capability

    Description

    Dispel

    ✔

    Access Control

    Access control technologies allow an agency to define policies concerning the allowable activities of users and entities to data and resources.

    Dispel Access Control Lists (ACLs) define allowable access policies by users to data and resources.

    ✔

    Protections for Data at Rest

    Data protection at rest aims to secure data stored on any device or storage medium.

    The Dispel database that maintains administrative functions is encrypted at rest with AES-256, block-level storage encryption.

    Line items marked with a ✔ are covered by Dispel's technology.

    Policy Enforcement Point Capabilities

    Overview

    Files PEP Security Capabilities

    File capabilities are available in Dispel's Virtual Desktops. These features are not part of Enclaves in general.

    Networking PEP Security Capabilities

    Resiliency PEP Security Capabilities

    Enterprise PEP Security Capabilities

    Unified Communications and Collaboration

    Data Protection

    Files
    Networking
    here

    Central Log Management with Analysis

    Storing telemetry needed to discover and respond to malicious activity in a manner that facilitates security analysis and data fusion.

    Enclaves allow for syslogging with ELK Stack support native.

    ✔

    Configuration Management

    Implementing a formal plan for documenting, and managing changes to the environment, and monitoring for deviations.

    All Enclave components build according to centralized SaltStack build scripts. Changes to Enclaves are managed via the central Engine.

    Incident Response Plan and Incident Handling

    Documenting and implementing a set of instructions or procedures to detect, respond to, limit consequences of malicious cyberattacks, and restore the integrity of the network and systems.

    ✔

    Inventory

    Developing, documenting, and maintaining a current inventory of all systems, networks, and components so that only authorized devices are given access, and unauthorized and unmanaged devices are found and prevented from gaining access.

    The Engine maintains an automatically updated inventory of all assets across all Enclaves, including historical records.

    Unauthorized devices cannot register with an Enclave as they lack the proper certificates, are not included in IP routing tables, and the SD-WAN orchestration database.

    ✔

    Least Privilege

    Designing the security architecture such that each entity is granted the minimum system resources and authorizations that the entity needs to perform its function.

    Enclave components build with least-privileged profiles. Access is granted to users explicitly based on security groups. Users must be invited into an Enclave, and belong to the same security group as an asset in order to access it.

    Dispel Enclaves are single-tenant and do not share resources across Enclaves.

    ✔

    Secure Administration

    Performing administrative tasks in a secure manner, using secure protocols

    Central administration is conducted under TLS 1.2.

    ✔

    Strong Authentication

    Verifying the identity of users, devices or other entities through rigorous means (e.g. multi-factor authentication) before granting access.

    Dispel mandates complex passwords, and supports the following multi-factor authentication systems: temporary one-time passwords (e.g., Google Authenticator), FIDO2 hardware tokens, RSA SecurID, and Apple biometrics (Face ID and Touch ID).

    ✔

    Time Synchronization

    Coordinating clocks on all systems (e.g. servers, workstations, network devices) to enable accurate comparison of timestamps between systems.

    Dispel leverages cloud provider time synchronization to ensure all Enclave systems coordinate clock times.

    Vulnerability Assessment

    Proactively working to discover vulnerabilities, including the use of both active and passive means of discovery, and taking action to mitigate discovered vulnerabilities.

    Dispel has its own internal vulnerability discovery methods, but we do not consider these applicable to the TIC in this context.

    Patch Management

    Patch management is the identification, acquisition, installation, and verification of patches for products and systems.

    Dispel provides patch management servers on which vetted updates may be staged for an installer to use to apply to their internal environments.

    ✔

    Auditing and Accounting

    Capturing business records, including logs and other telemetry, and making them available for auditing and accounting as required.

    The Dispel Engine maintains logs of all system provisioning and deletion events. Additional syslogging and session recording of virtual desktops is also available.

    ✔

    Resilience

    Ensuring that systems, services, and protections maintain acceptable performance under adverse conditions.

    Dispel integrates with seven public cloud providers, spanning over 150 data centers globally. In the event of a cloud- or regional-outage, services can be transferred to other areas.

    Enterprise Threat Intelligence

    Obtaining threat intelligence from private and government sources, and implementing mitigations for the identified risks.

    Situational Awareness

    Maintaining effective awareness, both current and historical, across all components.

    Dynamic Threat Discovery

    Using dynamic approaches (e.g. heuristics, baselining, etc.) to discover new malicious activity.

    ✔

    Policy Enforcement Parity

    Consistently applying security protections and other policies, independent of the conveyance mechanism used.

    All policies are centrally enforced by the Engine for users, and at build time by SaltStack scripts during virtual machine image provisioning.

    ✔

    Effective Use of Shared Services

    Employing shared services, where applicable, that can be individually tailored, measured to independently validate service conformance, and offer effective protections for tenants against malicious actors, both external as well as internal to the service provider.

    All Dispel Enclaves are single-tenant, and therefore not exposed to pivoting between environments. Administrators may choose the number of Enclaves, which correspond to the amount of segmentation desired.

    ✔

    Integrated Desktop, Mobile, and Remote Policies

    Defining polices such that they apply to a given agency entity no matter its location.

    All remote access is granted via Enclaves uniformly. Policy rules are applied universally for both desktop/mobile devices, and for virtual desktops.

    ✔

    Detonation Chamber

    Detonation Chambers facilitate the detection of malicious code through the use of protected and isolated execution environments to analyze the files.

    Virtual desktops are isolated, single-tenant OS environments on hypervisors. Virtual desktops are designed to be destroyed after use to prevent malware spread and persistence.

    Data Loss Prevention

    Data loss prevention (DLP) technologies detect instances of the exfiltration, either malicious or accidental, of agency data.

    ✔

    Host Containment

    Host Containment protections enable a network to revoke a host’s access to the network.

    Hosts may be removed from a Dispel Enclave by revoking their access permissions and then cycling the Entry Point the host is connecting to.

    ✔

    Network Segmentation

    Network Segmentation separates a given network into subnetworks, facilitating security controls between the subnetworks, and decreasing the attack surface of the network.

    Each Enclave SD-WAN is made up of two cascade cipher VPN tunnels. The underlying VPN infrastructure is single-tenant. Each Enclave is thus segmented from one another, and a compromise on one cannot spread laterally to another.

    Enclaves are also Moving Target Defense systems, reducing any given attack surface to just the duration the Enclave Entry Point exists.

    ✔

    Microsegmentation

    Microsegmentation divides the network, either physically or virtually, according to the communication needs of application and data workflows, facilitating security controls to protect the data.

    Within Enclaves, security groups define what users are allowed to access what resources. Dispel Wicket ESIs--which provide VPN uplinks from on-premises systems--support IP and port whitelisting and blacklists.

    ✔

    Regional Delivery

    Regional Delivery technologies enable the deployment of agency services across geographically diverse locations.

    Dispel's cloud partners provides access to over 150 data centers across the globe. This includes North America, South America, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Asia.

    ✔

    VPN

    Virtual Private Network solutions provide a secure communications mechanism between networks that may traverse across unprotected or public networks.

    Dispel provides VPNs natively within an Enclave. The default system is two cascade ciphered OpenVPN AES-256 tunnels, with independently generate 4096-bit RSA keys for the initial key exchange. Administrators have the option of using WolfSSL as as interior VPN tunnel as well.

    ✔

    Connection Termination

    Connection termination mechanisms ensure the meeting host can positively control participation through inactivity timeouts, on-demand prompts, unique access codes for each meeting, host participant eviction, and even meeting duration limits.

    Data Loss Prevention

    Mechanisms should be implemented to control the sharing of information between UCC participants, intentional or incidental. This may be integrated into additional agency DLP technologies and can include keyword matching, attachment file type or existence prohibitions, attachment size limitations, or even audio/visual filters.

    ✔

    Protections for Data in Transit

    Data protection in transit, or data in motion, aims to secure data that is actively moving from one location to another, such as across the internet or through a private enterprise network.

    Dispel transmits information over the public Internet. We protect data in transit with strong encryption, reviewing and updating to employ the latest cryptographically reliable cipher suites.

    For example, at this time, when you are connected to your Dispel services through our client application or a hardware device, and for internal server-to-server transmissions, we use two layers of cascade ciphered AES-256-CBC with independent 4096-bit RSA keys for the initial key exchange. Keys are typically generated by segmented compute systems designed with randomness in mind, and distinguished between clients.

    When you are using one of our browser-accessible applications, we employ AES-256-GCM encryption. These may be secured using SHA-256 with 2048-or 4096-bit RSA keys, depending on the security requirements of the application. This means many communications through Dispel are protected by three layers of encryption. We encrypt data multiple times, using different ciphers, for several reasons. As one example, by using different ciphers encrypted data is less susceptible to a zero day flaw that could affect both at the same time.

    Data Loss Prevention

    DLP technologies detect instances of the exfiltration, either malicious or accidental, of agency data.

    Data Access and Use Telemetry

    Data access and use telemetry identifies agency sensitive data stored, processed, or transmitted, including those located at a service provider, and enforces detailed logging for access or changes to sensitive data.

    Resiliency
    Enterprise
    Unified Communications and Collaboration (UCC)
    Data Protection

    CIP-003-9/003-11

    Maps Dispel capabilities to NERC CIP-003-9 and CIP-003-11 for OT security and compliance

    This page explains how the Dispel Zero Trust Engine (ZTE) can support your program’s alignment to NERC CIP-003 (Security Management Controls)—with specific attention to Low Impact BES Cyber System environments (where CIP-003 contains prescriptive “plan” controls), and how those same Dispel capabilities could be leveraged in Medium/High Impact environments (where CIP-003 is primarily a governance/policy anchor and technical controls are implemented under other CIP standards).

    Audience: OT security and compliance stakeholders evaluating whether Dispel can be used to satisfy or support CIP-003 controls and evidence expectations.


    • This mapping is provided for implementation guidance and audit preparation. Your organization remains responsible for determining applicability, documenting procedures, and demonstrating compliance.

    • CIP-003 R2 (Cyber Security Plan(s) with Attachment 1 controls) applies to Responsible Entities with Low Impact BES Cyber Systems. For Medium/High Impact BES Cyber Systems, CIP-003 primarily requires policies, accountability, and delegation; technical controls are largely implemented under other standards (e.g., CIP-005, CIP-007, CIP-010, CIP-011, etc.).


    In scope

    Dispel product in scope

    • Dispel Zero Trust Engine (ZTE), including:

      • Dispel Virtual Desktops (VDIs) used as managed “jump hosts”

      • Session recording / replay

      • Integrated Threat Monitoring (optional add-on module)

      • Exportable audit logs and access governance controls (e.g., Access Windows)

    Dispel deployment models referenced

    • SaaS: Dispel-managed cloud-hosted platform services; customer/on-prem connectivity via customer-deployed gateways (Wicket ESIs).

    • Customer Cloud (single-tenant hosted): Deployed into your cloud environment (e.g., AWS/Azure) with customer-selected residency and infrastructure ownership boundaries.

    • On-Premises: Fully contained deployment inside customer-controlled environments (including scenarios that are offline or air-gapped).


    CIP-003 is the management-controls backbone of NERC CIP. It does two things:

    1. Governance and accountability: It requires a Responsible Entity to maintain leadership-approved cyber security policies, identify a senior accountable manager (the CIP Senior Manager), and document delegation of authority.

    2. Baseline technical expectations for Low Impact BES Cyber Systems: Because Low Impact environments do not have the same breadth of prescriptive controls as Medium/High, CIP-003 includes a required set of baseline plan sections (Attachment 1) covering awareness, physical security, electronic access controls, incident response, and protections against malicious code introduction—plus vendor remote access controls (in CIP-003-9) and expanded communications security controls (in CIP-003-11).

    Dispel is most directly relevant where CIP-003 demands controlled remote access, authentication, monitoring, logging, and evidence—especially in the Attachment 1 electronic access control sections for Low Impact environments.


    CIP-003-9 strengthens Low Impact controls—especially around vendor electronic remote access (e.g., explicitly requiring a method to determine active vendor remote access, disable it when no longer needed, and detect known/suspected malicious communications associated with vendor remote access).

    Operationally, many Responsible Entities address CIP-003-9 by standardizing vendor remote access through a controlled access platform that can enforce least privilege, time-bound access, and strong auditability.

    CIP-003-11 builds on prior revisions by expanding communications security expectations for Low Impact environments (including Shared Cyber Infrastructure supporting Low Impact BES Cyber Systems). One key shift is that requirements that were previously “vendor remote access–specific” become part of a broader inbound/outbound electronic access control construct, including:

    • Detecting known/suspected malicious communications for inbound/outbound electronic access

    • Authenticating each remote user


    CIP standards are generally technology-agnostic: they focus on the control outcomes you must demonstrate (e.g., access restrictions, monitoring, evidence), not a mandated product architecture. That said, Responsible Entities often apply risk-based architecture decisions based on:

    • Whether the environment is internet-connected (SaaS requires some form of connectivity).

    • Whether internal governance or regulatory posture requires single-tenant hosting, customer-controlled cloud, or on-prem-only deployment for specific tiers or assets.

    • How you intend to treat and protect audit evidence such as session recordings, logs, and identity metadata.

    Dispel’s recommended default is SaaS for speed of deployment, continuous updates, and a managed operating model; however, Customer Cloud and On-Premises exist for cases where the Responsible Entity requires tighter residency/ownership boundaries or offline operation.


    In typical use, Dispel stores/processes cyber-security-relevant operational data such as:

    • Identity and authentication metadata

    • Connection/session logs and administrative audit trails

    • Session recordings / replays (single-tenant recording infrastructure)

    • File transfer artifacts (when used)

    Retention (typical defaults):

    • Logs are typically retained for near-term operational use and longer-term archive

    • Session recording retention is customer-configurable and typically deployed as a rolling window (commonly ~30 days), depending on the recording capacity purchased


    CIP-003 R1 requires that the Responsible Entity maintain documented cyber security policies that collectively address required topic areas and that those policies are reviewed and approved by the CIP Senior Manager at least once every 15 calendar months.

    • In Medium/High Impact environments, R1 is primarily about ensuring your policies cover the topic areas aligned to the broader CIP family (personnel & training, electronic security perimeters, system security management, change management, information protection, etc.).

    • In Low Impact environments, R1 ensures your policies support the baseline plan/control sections that the entity must implement under R2.

    Dispel does not “create your policy” or act as the CIP Senior Manager. Instead, Dispel is commonly referenced inside your policies and standards as the approved remote access enforcement mechanism (e.g., “All interactive remote access to OT/BES assets must be brokered through Dispel with time-bound access approval, least-privilege ACLs, session recording, and logging forwarded to the monitoring stack.”).

    Dispel can also support policy maturity by making the policy enforceable in day-to-day operations:

    • You can implement least privilege and scoped access controls down to device/port/protocol level.

    • You can require time-bound access approval before access is permitted.

    • You can produce consistent evidence (logs, session recordings, access approvals) that supports policy compliance.

    Auditors typically expect to see:

    • The actual policy documents, revision history, and evidence of CIP Senior Manager approval within the required interval

    • Policy language that is consistent with how access is actually implemented

    • Traceability from policy statements → procedures/standards → technical implementation evidence

    Topic
    Low Impact BES Cyber Systems
    Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
    High Impact BES Cyber Systems

    CIP-003 R2 requires Responsible Entities with Low Impact BES Cyber Systems to implement one or more documented cyber security plan(s) that include the sections in Attachment 1. The intent is to ensure Low Impact environments have baseline controls for awareness, physical protection, access restrictions, incident response readiness, and malware/removable media risk mitigation—plus explicit controls around remote/vendor access and monitoring.

    Key practical point: R2 is satisfied by demonstrating:

    1. your plan(s) include each required section, and

    2. you can show implementation evidence for each section.

    Dispel is most directly mapped to the Electronic Access Controls sections, where auditors will look for:

    • Restriction to only necessary inbound/outbound connectivity paths

    • Strong authentication for remote users and connectivity methods (as applicable)

    • Evidence that access is controlled, monitored, and reviewable

    Dispel is supporting, not primary, for Awareness, Physical Security, and Incident Response governance. Those remain primarily customer-owned processes.


    This section requires that the entity reinforce cyber security practices at least once every 15 calendar months for personnel with cyber or authorized access responsibilities related to Low Impact environments.

    Dispel is not a security awareness training platform. However, Responsible Entities commonly incorporate Dispel operational requirements (e.g., no shared accounts, access request justification, recording notice, approved workflow expectations) into:

    • security awareness reinforcement communications

    • role-based training for OT operators, engineers, and vendors who use remote access

    Auditors typically expect to see dated evidence of reinforcement (communications, training artifacts, meeting notes, etc.).


    This section requires physical access controls for:

    • the Low Impact asset or the locations of Low Impact BES Cyber Systems, and

    • the cyber systems that provide the electronic access controls (where applicable)

    Dispel cannot enforce your facility physical security program. The relevant Dispel contribution is helping you identify which components in your architecture are “security-enforcing” and therefore should be included in your physical protection scope. For example:

    • On-Prem deployments: your hosted Dispel components (recording servers, gateways, virtual infrastructure) become physical assets you must protect.

    • SaaS deployments: customer-side gateways (i.e. Wicket ESIs) and any customer-hosted components remain in your physical protection scope; cloud infrastructure physical security is part of the provider/operator model.


    This is the most directly relevant section for Dispel.

    CIP-003-9 requires Low Impact environments to:

    • Permit only inbound and outbound electronic access that the entity deems necessary for routable protocol communications.

    • Authenticate dial-up connectivity (if used).

    • Additionally (in Section 6), implement vendor remote access controls including the ability to determine active vendor remote access, disable it when no longer needed, and detect known/suspected malicious communications for vendor electronic remote access.

    Dispel is designed to make “only what’s necessary” implementable and auditable by centralizing remote access through a controlled pathway:


    This section requires that the entity have a cyber security incident response plan, including roles/responsibilities, handling steps, testing at least once every 36 months, and updates after tests/incidents.

    Dispel does not replace your incident response plan. It strengthens incident response execution and evidence by providing:

    • session recordings and session logs to support investigation and reconstruction

    • administrative audit trails showing who approved access and what changed

    • telemetry that can be integrated into the entity’s detection and response workflows


    This section requires methods to mitigate the introduction of malicious code for applicable systems, including handling of Transient Cyber Assets (TCAs) and Removable Media, and special handling where a party other than the Responsible Entity manages the TCA/removable media process.

    Dispel is not an endpoint anti-malware solution for your field laptops or removable media process. However, Dispel can reduce risk by:

    • reducing the need for uncontrolled vendor endpoints to directly touch OT assets (vendors work inside controlled remote sessions)

    • providing audit evidence for remote activities and file transfer workflows when used

    • integrating logs/telemetry into your broader monitoring program


    Attachment 1 / Section
    Low Impact BES Cyber Systems
    Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
    High Impact BES Cyber Systems

    R3 requires the Responsible Entity to identify a CIP Senior Manager by name and to document changes within the required timeframe. The intent is accountability: a named senior individual is responsible for approving policies and ensuring the program is resourced and maintained.

    Dispel does not provide or replace this role. Where Dispel helps is indirect:

    • As an operational control platform, Dispel provides evidence and reporting that a CIP Senior Manager (or their delegates) can rely on for oversight, periodic reviews, and program assurance.

    Auditors typically expect a dated designation document and change tracking.

    Topic
    Low Impact BES Cyber Systems
    Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
    High Impact BES Cyber Systems

    R4 requires a documented process for delegation of authority (if used), including who is delegated, for what actions, when, and approval by the CIP Senior Manager. The intent is to ensure delegated CIP actions remain controlled, auditable, and current.

    Dispel does not define your delegation process, but it does support the operational reality behind delegations by allowing you to:

    • separate administrative roles and operational approver roles

    • enforce workflow approvals for access

    • produce audit trails showing who approved/changed access and when

    Auditors typically expect:

    • the delegation documentation itself (names/titles, delegated actions, dates)

    • evidence that operational approvals and actions match the delegation model

    Topic
    Low Impact BES Cyber Systems
    Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
    High Impact BES Cyber Systems

    When Responsible Entities use Dispel to implement remote access controls, common audit artifacts include:

    • Access Windows (who requested/approved access, scope, time bounds, justification, and changes)

    • User lists and role/group membership

    • Device/asset inventories and per-device ACL mappings (including allowed ports/protocols)

    • Administrative audit logs (changes to policies, users, ACLs, approvals)

  • Protecting remote user authentication information in transit

  • Determining active vendor access and disabling it when no longer needed

  • This directly increases the value of platforms that deliver controlled remote access with strong authentication, encryption, monitoring, and audit evidence—which is where Dispel is typically positioned.

    Asset inventory metadata (targets, sites, zones, routes)

    Provides a standard, enforceable remote access mechanism you can reference in policy; produces audit-ready access evidence

    Used as a controlled remote access implementation referenced in CIP-005/CIP-007 aligned policies and procedures

    Same as Medium; often paired with more restrictive deployment decisions (Customer Cloud / On-Prem) based on risk posture

    SaaS vs On-Prem considerations

    SaaS often acceptable when connectivity exists and policy permits; otherwise Customer Cloud/On-Prem

    Same decision model—entity risk posture typically drives deployment boundaries

    Same decision model; stricter internal constraints are more common

    Least privilege enforcement: Access can be scoped down to device/IP and port/protocol using ACL concepts rather than broad network access.

  • Time-bound access: Access Windows allow administrators to grant just-in-time access; without an access window, user access can be restricted.

  • Vendor visibility and shutdown: You can identify who has access, who approved it, and the time window; you can revoke or disable access quickly when work is complete or risk is identified.

  • Monitoring and detection: Dispel can provide high-fidelity session/connection telemetry and, with Integrated Threat Monitoring, a managed detection layer; otherwise, forwarding Dispel logs to your SIEM/monitoring stack supports the “detect known/suspected malicious communications” outcome for remote access pathways.

  • In SaaS, the control plane and managed session infrastructure are cloud-hosted, while customer-side gateways provide the controlled path into customer networks. In Customer Cloud/On-Prem, you can place more components under your direct control to align with stricter internal architecture policies or offline needs.

    What CIP-003-11 requires (control intent)

    CIP-003-11 consolidates and expands electronic access expectations so Low Impact environments can better resist coordinated cyber threats. In addition to restricting connectivity, it emphasizes:

    • Detecting known/suspected malicious communications for inbound and outbound electronic access

    • Authenticating each remote user

    • Protecting remote user authentication information in transit

    • Determining active vendor access and disabling it when no longer needed

    Dispel’s contribution is strongest where the standard requires both control enforcement and evidence:

    1) Restricting connectivity (“only what’s necessary”) Dispel can implement access down to device/port/protocol and enforce that non-permitted connections are not established.

    2) Authenticating each remote user Dispel supports federated identity (e.g., OIDC-based SSO) and role-based access models so each remote user is uniquely authenticated and authorized according to policy.

    3) Protecting authentication information in transit Dispel sessions and tunnels are designed to be end-to-end encrypted, supporting the control intent of protecting authentication data while traversing networks.

    4) Detecting known/suspected malicious communications Dispel can produce detailed logs and session telemetry for detection and investigation, and Integrated Threat Monitoring can add continuous monitoring and response. Where customers operate their own SOC/SIEM stack, Dispel telemetry can be forwarded for centralized detection and alerting.

    5) Determining and disabling vendor access Access Windows and administrative controls provide a direct mechanism for proving:

    • when vendor access was permitted,

    • who approved it,

    • what the vendor could access, and

    • how access is revoked/disabled when no longer required.

    Same as Medium.

    Section 3 — Electronic Access Controls

    Applicable. Dispel strongly supports this: least privilege ACLs, controlled paths, session logging/recording, and SIEM integration.

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2, but similar outcomes are typically implemented under CIP-005/CIP-007 for Medium. Dispel is often used to support those outcomes.

    Same as Medium, typically with stricter internal design constraints.

    Section 4 — Incident Response

    Applicable. Customer-owned plan; Dispel provides investigation evidence (logs + recordings).

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2 (incident response requirements addressed elsewhere).

    Same as Medium.

    Section 5 — TCA & Removable Media

    Applicable. Customer-owned; Dispel can reduce exposure by brokering access and providing audit evidence for remote workflows.

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2; similar concerns are typically addressed under other controls and internal policy.

    Same as Medium.

    Section 6 — Vendor Electronic Remote Access (CIP-003-9 construct)

    Applicable. Dispel strongly supports: time-bound access approvals, vendor session visibility, termination/disablement, and monitoring/telemetry.

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2, but vendor remote access control is typically a major focus under CIP-005/CIP-007.

    Same as Medium.

    Attachment 1 / Section
    Low Impact BES Cyber Systems
    Medium Impact BES Cyber Systems
    High Impact BES Cyber Systems

    Section 1 — Awareness

    Applicable. Customer-owned. Dispel supports role-based operational training inputs and evidence context.

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2.

    Same as Medium.

    Section 2 — Physical Security

    Applicable. Customer-owned. Include customer-side gateways/recording components in physical scope where relevant.

    Indirect only: provides operational oversight evidence (access approvals, logs, recordings)

    Indirect only

    Indirect only

    Supports enforceable role separation and audit trails for approvals/changes

    Same

    Same

    Session logs and session recordings (as applicable)
  • SIEM-forwarded logs and correlation references (if used)

  • Threat monitoring alerts and investigation notes (if Integrated Threat Monitoring is in scope)

  • CIP-003-11 has been filed and published for regulatory action with an associated implementation plan. You should confirm enforceability timelines for your jurisdiction and registration status.

    Is R1 applicable?

    Yes

    Yes

    Yes

    What R1 primarily drives

    Policy basis for Low Impact plan controls and governance cadence

    Governance anchor; policy coverage across the CIP control families

    Same as Medium, typically with higher internal rigor and stronger evidence expectations

    Section 1 — Awareness

    Applicable. Customer-owned. Dispel supports role-based operational training inputs and evidence context.

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2 (covered by other CIP requirements/program elements).

    Same as Medium.

    Section 2 — Physical Security

    Applicable. Customer-owned. Include customer-side gateways/recording components in physical scope where relevant.

    Is R3 applicable?

    Yes

    Yes

    Yes

    Control ownership

    Customer-owned

    Customer-owned

    Customer-owned

    Is R4 applicable?

    Yes

    Yes

    Yes

    Control ownership

    Customer-owned

    Customer-owned

    Customer-owned

    How CIP-003 fits into the NERC CIP program (why this standard exists)

    Version scope: CIP-003-9 vs CIP-003-11 (what changed and why it matters)

    Dispel deployment considerations in BES environments (Low / Medium / High)

    Data handling and audit evidence fundamentals (important for CIP-003 narratives)

    Handling potential BCSI exposure in session recordings

    Dispel is not intended to be the system-of-record for BCSI. However, it is conceivable that a user could view screens containing sensitive information through a VDI or browser session and that screen content could be captured by session recording. Treat recordings as potentially sensitive operational evidence: restrict access, define retention deliberately, and align handling with your internal classification policy.

    Requirement R1 — Cyber Security Policies

    What CIP-003 requires (control intent)

    How Dispel supports alignment

    What auditors typically expect

    Low / Medium / High summary (R1)

    Requirement R2 — Cyber Security Plan(s) for Low Impact (Attachment 1)

    What CIP-003 requires (control intent)

    How Dispel supports alignment (where it fits—and where it does not)

    Attachment 1 — Section 1: Cyber Security Awareness

    What the section requires

    How Dispel supports alignment

    What auditors typically expect

    Attachment 1 — Section 2: Physical Security Controls

    What the section requires

    How Dispel supports alignment

    Attachment 1 — Section 3: Electronic Access Controls

    What CIP-003-9 requires (control intent)

    How Dispel supports alignment

    Attachment 1 — Section 4: Cyber Security Incident Response

    What the section requires

    How Dispel supports alignment

    Attachment 1 — Section 5: TCA & Removable Media Malicious Code Risk Mitigation

    What the section requires

    How Dispel supports alignment

    Low / Medium / High summary table (R2 and Attachment 1)

    Requirement R3 — CIP Senior Manager

    What CIP-003 requires (control intent)

    How Dispel supports alignment

    What auditors typically expect

    Low / Medium / High summary (R3)

    Requirement R4 — Delegation of Authority

    What CIP-003 requires (control intent)

    How Dispel supports alignment

    What auditors typically expect

    Low / Medium / High summary (R4)

    Practical evidence mapping: what you can typically export from Dispel for audits

    Important notes (read first)

    How Dispel helps

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2 (physical requirements addressed elsewhere).

    How Dispel helps

    How Dispel helps

    SaaS vs On-Prem relevance

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2.

    Same as Medium.

    Section 3 — Electronic Access Controls (expanded)

    Applicable. Dispel strongly supports: least privilege, per-user authentication, encrypted sessions, monitoring/detection via Integrated Threat Monitoring or SIEM forwarding, and vendor access determination/disablement via Access Windows and admin controls.

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2, but similar outcomes are typically implemented under CIP-005/CIP-007 for Medium.

    Same as Medium, typically with stricter internal design constraints.

    Section 4 — Incident Response

    Applicable. Customer-owned plan; Dispel provides investigation evidence (logs + recordings).

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2.

    Same as Medium.

    Section 5 — TCA & Removable Media

    Applicable. Customer-owned; Dispel can reduce exposure by brokering access and providing audit evidence for remote workflows.

    Not applicable under CIP-003 R2.

    Same as Medium.

    How Dispel supports alignment